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NOT OF WOMAN BORN:A SCIENTIFIC 
FANTASY 
Jennifer S. Hendricks
†
 
ABSTRACT 
This Article explores the legal implications of a scientific fantasy: 
building artificial wombs that could gestate a human child from 
conception to birth. Because claims about the technological 
possibility of artificial wombs in the foreseeable future are likely 
overstated, the focus of the Article is the effect that the fantasy of 
artificial gestation has on the legal discourse about pregnancy and 
reproduction today. 
                                                                                                                 
  The title refer refers both to the riddle at the heart of Macbeth and to Adrienne Rich’s 
classic distinction between the institution of motherhood as a form of social control and the 
practice of mothering as individual expression and empowerment. See WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, 
MACBETH act 4, sc. 1 (Macbeth cannot be killed by any man “of woman born”); id. at act 5, sc. 
7 (Macduff revealing that he was “from his mother’s womb / Untimely ripp’d”); ADRIENNE 
RICH, OF WOMAN BORN: MOTHERHOOD AS EXPERIENCE AND INSTITUTION 13 (1976) 
(distinguishing between “the potential relationship of any woman to her powers of reproduction 
and to children” and “the institution, which aims at ensuring that that potential . . . shall remain 
under male control”) (emphasis in the original); see also Andrea O’Reilly, introduction to FROM 
MOTHERHOOD TO MOTHERING: THE LEGACY OF ADRIENNE RICH’S OF WOMAN BORN 2 (2004) 
(“The oppressive and the empowering dimensions of maternity, as well as the complex 
relationship between the two, first identified by Rich in Of Woman Born have been the focus of 
feminist research on motherhood over the last two and a half decades.”). 
†  Associate Professor, University of Tennessee College of Law. For comments on earlier 
drafts of this article, thanks are due to Beth Burkstrand-Reid, Cyra Choudhury, Shelley 
Cavalieri, Richard Delgado, Maxine Eichner, Jessie Hill, Maya Manian, Vernelia Randall, Ann 
Shalleck, and Jean Stefanic; thanks also to the organizers of the Emerging Family Law Scholars 
& Teachers Conference and the Feminist Legal Theory Collaborative Research Network, 
especially Max Eichner and Clare Huntington. Special thanks to my brother, S. Michael 
Hendricks, post-doctoral fellow in Organismic and Evolutionary Biology, Harvard University, 
who guided me through the scientific issues discussed in this article while always reminding me 
not to expect science to provide answers to social and moral questions. 
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The Article first places the fantasy of artificial gestation in the 
context of theories about reproduction that western science has 
propounded. The history of scientific theorizing about reproduction is 
a history of scientists emphasizing the male contribution and 
minimizing the degree to which men are dependent on women for the 
creation of their offspring. Feminist scientists and philosophers of 
science have demonstrated how this sex-based ideology has skewed 
and hampered scientific efforts to understand the biology of 
reproduction. Despite the progress that has been made, scientific 
pronouncements about the prospects for building artificial wombs 
continue to reflect the biases that have historically plagued 
reproductive science, making it likely that those prospects are 
systematically overstated. 
The Article then turns to how the prospect of artificial gestation 
affects legal discourse about reproduction. For example, legal 
scholars increasingly cite the prospect of artificial wombs as a 
solution to the controversy over abortion, since the fetus could 
survive without requiring the pregnant woman to sustain it. Pregnant 
women seeking abortions could instead be required to choose 
between continuing the pregnancy or undergoing an extraction 
procedure in which the embryo or fetus would be transferred to an 
artificial womb. This predicted “solution” informs legal analysis of 
the scope of reproductive rights today by constructing the woman and 
the fetus as separate individuals with opposing interests. Similarly, 
comparisons between mechanical and human gestators shape legal 
rhetoric about commercial surrogacy and the legal control of 
pregnant women. 
Feminist legal theory has demonstrated that the idealized 
autonomous individual is a myth; the fantasy of artificial gestation is 
a psychic representation of that myth. This myth both reflects and 
contributes to an ideology that minimizes the importance of the 
human connection of pregnancy. 
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“A theory about the stars never becomes a part of the being of the 
stars. A theory about man enters his consciousness, determines his 
self-understanding, and modifies his very existence.”1 
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INTRODUCTION 
This Article explores the legal implications of a scientific fantasy: 
the fantasy of building artificial wombs that could gestate a human 
child from conception until birth.
2
 Fantasy refers not only to an 
                                                                                                                 
1 ABRAHAM JOSHUA HESCHEL, WHO IS MAN? 8 (1965), quoted in Athena Beldecos et al., 
The Importance of Feminist Critique for Contemporary Cell Biology, HYPATIA, Spring 1988, at 
61, 73. 
2 Choosing simplicity over precision, this article refers to the culmination of artificial 
gestation as “birth” rather than using some other term, such as “decanting.” 
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ambition, but also to the creation of “unrealistic or improbable mental 
images in response to psychological [or, in this case, ideological] 
need.”3 Skeptical of claims that artificial gestation will be possible in 
the near future, this Article focuses on the effect that the fantasy of 
artificial gestation has on legal and scientific discourse about 
pregnancy today. 
Part I describes the current lay of the land with respect to artificial 
womb technology: its definition, potential uses, and stage of 
development. This Part also explains some of the reasons for 
skepticism about claims that artificial gestation is imminent. 
Part II places the fantasy of artificial gestation in the context of 
theories of reproduction that have been propounded by western 
science. The history of scientific theorizing about reproduction is a 
history of scientists emphasizing the male contribution and 
minimizing the degree to which men are dependent on women for the 
creation of their offspring. In recent decades, feminist scientists and 
philosophers of science have demonstrated how sex-based ideology 
has skewed and hampered scientific efforts to understand the biology 
of reproduction. Nonetheless, scientific pronouncements about the 
prospects for artificial gestation continue to reflect the biases that 
have historically plagued reproductive science, making it likely that 
those prospects are systematically overstated. 
Part III shows how belief in the prospect of artificial gestation 
shapes current legal discourse and practices regarding reproduction. 
For example, legal scholars increasingly cite the prospect of artificial 
wombs as a solution to the controversy over abortion, since the fetus 
could survive without requiring the pregnant woman to sustain it.
4
 
Pregnant women seeking abortions could instead be required to 
choose between continuing the pregnancy or undergoing an extraction 
procedure in which the embryo or fetus would be transferred to an 
artificial womb. This predicted “solution” informs legal analysis of 
the scope of reproductive rights today by constructing the woman and 
the fetus as separate individuals with opposing interests. Similarly, 
comparisons between mechanical wombs and human gestators shape 
legal rhetoric about commercial surrogacy and the legal control of 
pregnant women. 
The fantasy of artificial gestation is both an artifact and an 
implement of a particular ideology of reproduction. This fantasy 
posits the embryo and fetus as essentially separate from the pregnant 
woman. This model of reproduction makes artificial gestation appear 
                                                                                                                 
3 WEBSTER’S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 449 (9th ed. 1988). 
4 See infra Part III.A.1 (analyzing this legal scholarship). 
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possible. Belief in artificial gestation, in turn, reinforces the 
underlying ideology, undermining alternative models of reproduction 
and gestation. In brief, the fantasy of artificial wombs is a psychic 
representation of our cultural myth of individual autonomy;
5
 invoking 
the fantasy further entrenches the myth. 
I. THE FANTASY OF ARTIFICIAL GESTATION 
This Part introduces the scientific and bioethics literature that 
proposes the creation of artificial wombs. Part I.A discusses the 
meaning of the term “artificial womb,” focusing on the use of 
artificial wombs for ectogenesis (human reproduction that occurs 
entirely outside the body). Part I.B summarizes the benefits that 
proponents cite to justify the development of artificial womb 
technology. Part I.C describes the technical barriers to artificial 
gestation and argues that proponents tend to emphasize the challenges 
of providing basic fetal life support but gloss over the developmental 
challenges that ectogenesis would entail. This point provides the 
foundation for Part II, which shows that this imbalance in emphasis 
reflects long-standing gender bias that has frequently skewed 
reproductive science. 
A. What Is An “Artificial Womb”? 
If a child could be created from gametes, without ever growing 
inside a person, the device that accomplished this feat would be 
considered an artificial womb. Such freestanding gestation is the 
ultimate goal of a few scientists who have designed their research 
specifically to that end.
6
 The technology that might accomplish this 
goal comes from two more general lines of research. First, the 
technology of in vitro fertilization and other research on embryos has 
lengthened the period of time that a fertilized egg can be kept alive 
and developing in a laboratory. Second, medical science strives to 
save premature infants at increasingly early points of delivery. If 
these two lines of research eventually met somewhere in the middle, 
we would have artificial wombs capable of complete ectogenesis—
the creation of a human child without any period of gestation in a 
woman’s body.7 
                                                                                                                 
5 See generally MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE AUTONOMY MYTH: A THEORY OF 
DEPENDENCY (2004) (discussing the need for a paradigm shift toward a caretaking society). 
6 See infra Part I.C. (discussing the work of Drs. Kyoshinori Kuwabara and Hung-Ching 
Liu). 
7 See Scott Gelfand, Introduction to ECTOGENESIS: ARTIFICIAL WOMB TECHNOLOGY 
AND THE FUTURE OF HUMAN REPRODUCTION 1, 2 (Scott Gelfand & John R. Shook, eds., 2006) 
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At least some proposed uses for artificial wombs are more akin to 
neonatal medicine. An embryo or fetus that began its development 
inside a woman might be transferred to the device at some point 
during pregnancy.
8
 That possibility raises the question: What are the 
features that would make such a device qualitatively different from 
current neonatal intensive care practices and thus warrant the 
designation “artificial womb”? The distinction might lie in the nature 
of the technology, the gestational age and moral status of the fetus, or 
the practical impact of the technology. 
With regard to the nature of the technology, techniques for 
rescuing premature infants might look like “artificial wombs” if they 
more closely resembled natural gestation. Many current treatments for 
premature babies resemble ordinary life support, only on a smaller 
scale. These techniques, however, may be reaching their limits. In the 
decades since Roe v. Wade,
9
 the threshold of fetal viability has barely 
moved, although survival rates for infants past that point have greatly 
improved.
10
 Many scientists believe they are reaching the limit of 
current technological approaches for sustaining premature infants, 
due to the need for a minimum level of lung development before an 
                                                                                                                 
 
[hereinafter ECTOGENESIS] (discussing the convergence of these two lines of research as the 
most likely path to complete ectogenesis); STEPHEN COLEMAN, THE ETHICS OF ARTIFICIAL 
UTERUSES: IMPLICATIONS FOR REPRODUCTION AND ABORTION 5 (2004) (discussing “indirect 
research” into creating an artificial uterus related to “solving the problems of human infertility 
. . . and research aimed at improving the survival rates of premature births”).  
8 Transfer from a pregnant woman to a machine might be desired for medical reasons or 
in lieu of abortion. Proposals to use artificial wombs as alternatives to abortion are discussed 
infra Parts I.B and III.A. Depending on how the technology develops, a mid-pregnancy transfer 
to a machine might be either more or less difficult than mechanical gestation for the full term. 
9 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
10 Compare id. at 160 (“Viability is usually placed at about seven months (28 weeks) but 
may occur earlier, even at 24 weeks.”), with I. Glenn Cohen & Sadath Sayeed, Fetal Pain, 
Abortion, Viability, and the Constitution, 39 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 235, 236–37 (2011) (reporting 
that in the United States, resuscitation is usually not attempted before 23 weeks; that the 
survival rate for earlier resuscitations is probably between 1 percent and 20 percent; and that “a 
heavy majority of survivors born below 23 weeks gestation by LMP will sustain permanent 
cognitive and physical disabilities”). See Paul Reidinger, Will Roe v. Wade Be Overruled?, 
A.B.A. J., July 1988, at 66, 69: 
The gist of all this is that the point of viability does not seem to be moving 
inexorably backward as Justice O'Connor suggested, indeed has moved barely at all 
since Roe was decided. The rates of survival for premature infants jump dramatically 
in most studies between the 24th and 28th weeks. One recent study showed that 
while only 20 percent of infants born at 24 weeks survived, 83 percent of those born 
at 28 weeks did. 
See also Nancy K. Rhoden, The New Neonatal Dilemma: Live Births from Late Abortions, 
72 GEO. L.J. 1451, 1452–1453, 1461 (1984) (noting that due to developments in perinatal 
medicine and associate technology that doctors are now able to save more babies born 
extremely prematurely). 
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infant can tolerate artificial ventilation.
11
 To move the point of 
viability further back in pregnancy would require a quantum leap, a 
qualitatively different technology that would more closely mimic the 
womb and thus support the infant more comprehensively. It might 
involve providing oxygen other than through the lungs, and it might 
require submersion in a liquid that simulates amniotic fluid.
12
 This 
technology might strike us as visually very similar to natural 
gestation. We would think of the submersion container as an artificial 
womb even if it could not substitute for a woman’s body for the entire 
period of pregnancy. 
Another basis for distinguishing artificial wombs from neonatal 
life support might lie in our beliefs or practices regarding the status of 
the fetus. We may be inclined to call a device an artificial womb, 
rather than merely another piece of neonatal technology, if it is able to 
take over from the human mother early enough that the embryo or 
fetus does not yet seem like a baby.
13
 
Relatedly, neonatal medicine may become artificial gestation 
because of its practical impact. Today, neonatal technology defines 
not only the survival prospects of premature infants, but also the 
legality of abortion.
14
 If technology could gestate a fetus removed 
from a woman before twelve weeks of gestation, when the vast 
majority of abortions are performed,
15
 widespread acceptance of early 
                                                                                                                 
11 See COLEMAN, supra note 7, at 8–9 (describing the continuing difficulties in delivering 
oxygen to premature babies and the use of steroids to accelerate lung development when 
premature birth is anticipated); Gregory Pence, What’s So Good About Natural Motherhood? 
(In Praise of Unnatural Gestation), in ECTOGENESIS 77, 86 (Scott Gelfand & John R. Shook, 
eds., 2006) (“For thirty years, viability of the lungs of the premature baby has been the absolute 
barrier to progress towards an artificial womb.”); Rhoden, supra note 10, at 1465 (“At present, 
fetal lung development is a limiting factor for neonatal survival because an infant whose lungs 
completely lack surfactant cannot survive.”). 
12 Alternative means of providing oxygen have been tried but have not yet surpassed 
ventilation as a means of effective treatment. For a discussion of alternative means of providing 
oxygen, see infra notes 56–60 and accompanying text. 
13 Cf. Joyce M. Raskin & Nadav Mazor, The Artificial Womb and Human Subject 
Research, in ECTOGENESIS, supra note 7, at 159, 168 (“We will become more sympathetic and 
attribute greater moral value to the fetus, growing in a glass tank, as it gains the shape of a 
human being.”); Mark A. Goldstein, Note, Choice Rights and Abortion: The Begetting Choice 
Right and State Obstacles to Choice in Light of Artificial Womb Technology, 51 S. CAL. L. REV. 
877, 921 (1978) (concluding that a fetal development standard should replace viability as the 
cutoff for legal abortion); Ken Martyn, Comment, Technological Advances and Roe v. Wade: 
The Need to Rethink Abortion Law, 29 UCLA L. REV. 1194, 1204 (1982) (same). This line of 
distinction is discussed further below, in connection with the effect of artificial wombs on 
abortion rights and the concept of viability in abortion doctrine. See infra Part II.B. 
14 See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992) 
(reaffirming Roe’s holding that states may prohibit abortion after viability). 
15 See Facts on Induced Abortion in the United States, GUTTMACHER INSTITUTE (Aug. 
2011), www.guttmacher.org/pubs/fb_induced_abortion.html (demonstrating via a pie chart that 
the vast majority of abortions take place prior to the twelfth week of gestation). 
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abortion might lead us to view that technology as qualitatively 
different from neonatal medicine. 
Artificial wombs might also take a variety of physical forms. This 
Article focuses on the prospect of freestanding wombs: human-made 
machines that could perform all the functions of gestation, either from 
conception or at least early enough to substitute for most abortions. 
There are also proposals, however, for what we might call quasi-
artificial wombs, which straddle the definitional borders between 
artificial gestation, surrogacy, and surgical cures for infertility. 
First, there is the possibility that an artificial, human-made womb 
could function inside a person’s body. A person who was not 
otherwise able to gestate could use the device to do so. Depending on 
the path of technological development, this could be either more 
difficult than freestanding gestation (because it would require 
miniaturization of the device) or less difficult (because it would 
involve supplementing existing organs and bodily processes rather 
than building a device from scratch). The former path of development 
would necessarily encounter all of the questions and problems raised 
by complete ectogenesis. The latter path would be relatively 
unproblematic from a legal and cultural perspective, since the 
artificial components could be understood as treatment for 
infertility.
16
 We would not have to face the unique questions raised by 
ectogenesis because children would still be gestated inside an existing 
person’s body. 
Second, non-human animals could be used to gestate human 
infants. Ethicists consider this option ethically more problematic, 
even if it might be technologically easier, as compared to gestation in 
a machine.
17
 
                                                                                                                 
16 See BARBARA KATZ ROTHMAN, RECREATING MOTHERHOOD: IDEOLOGY AND 
TECHNOLOGY IN A PATRIARCHAL SOCIETY 257 (1989) (supporting gestational technology used 
within the body, including by men, but opposing extracorporeal gestation); Noa Ben-Asher, The 
Curing Law: On the Evolution of Baby-Making Markets, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 1885, 1888–
1906 (2009) (arguing that society is more willing to accept reproductive technologies that are 
perceived as cures for disease). Use of an artificial womb by a person otherwise considered 
male would raise cultural and legal questions similar to those that were raised in recent popular 
discussions of a pregnant transgendered man. See Russell Goldman, It’s My Right to Have Kid, 
Pregnant Man Tells Oprah, ABC NEWS (Apr. 3, 2008), 
http://abcnews.go.com/Health/story?id=4581943&page=1#.TyxuyFy0zQM. (reporting on 
Thomas Beatie, a transgendered man whose pregnancy made headlines in 2008). 
17 See COLEMAN, supra note 7, at 1–2 (excluding non-human gestation from the scope of 
discussion in a book-length treatment of ectogenesis because the use of animals raises additional 
ethical issues). Coleman does not specify whether he perceives the additional issues as 
pertaining to the animals’ interests, the humanity of the resulting child, or both. For an 
interesting discussion of legal and cultural concerns about the use of animals in human 
reproductive processes, see Maneesha Deckha, Holding onto Humanity: Animals, Dignity, and 
Anxiety in Canada’s Assisted Human Reproduction Act, 5 UNBOUND 21, 42–48 (2009) 
(discussing the Assisted Human Reproduction Act, which prohibits human gestation in a non-
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Third, women who are brain dead or in persistent vegetative states 
could serve as gestational surrogates.
18
 Women could be asked in 
advance whether they would be willing to gestate a fetus after their 
own brain death, in the same way that people today are asked to 
consent to donation of their organs.
19
 Doctors have already 
successfully sustained pregnancies in women who were raped while 
in vegetative states
20
 and others who were already pregnant when they 
experienced brain death.
21
 Initiating and staging an entire pregnancy 
in a brain dead woman would likely pose additional challenges, but it 
would be easier and cheaper than inventing and building gestation 
machines.
22
 
Each of these last three possibilities—prosthetic wombs, animal 
gestation, and post-mortem gestation—raises its own ethical, legal, 
and cultural questions. The focus of this Article, however, is on true 
ectogenesis—mechanical gestation outside the body, for all or a 
substantial portion of fetal development—and the questions it raises 
about gestation, mothers, and human connection and dependency. A 
true artificial womb would be able to grow a child from conception to 
birth, or at least be able to take over from the human mother by the 
end of the first trimester. The next Section discusses the reasons why 
we might want to build such a machine. 
                                                                                                                 
 
human life form). 
18 See Rosalie Ber, Ethical Issues in Gestational Surrogacy, 21 THEORETICAL MED. & 
BIOETHICS 153, 164–65 (2000) (proposing that brain dead women or women in persistent 
vegetative states be used as surrogates). 
19 See id. at 165 (noting that an additional sentence could be added to existing organ donor 
cards specifying whether they would be willing to gestate a fetus in the event of her brain 
death). 
20 See Doe v. Westfall Health Care Ctr., Inc., 755 N.Y.S.2d 769, 771 (N.Y. App. Div. 
2002) (ruling on a tort suit involving rape of a patient in a chronic vegetative state who became 
pregnant and gave birth); Daniel A. Manion, Rights That Are Wrong, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
1, 4 (1996) (describing a case involving a baby born “to a comatose woman who was raped”). 
21 See Julien S. Murphy, Is Pregnancy Necessary? Feminist Concerns About Ectogenesis, 
HYPATIA, Fall 1989, at 66, 69 (“[R]esearch techniques for sustaining pregnancies in brain-dead 
women have resulted in a few live births showing that fetuses can thrive in the bodies of brain-
dead pregnant women if there is proper temperature regulation, intubation, and ventilation and 
all vital organs remain unharmed.”); James M. Jordan, III, Note, Incubating for the State: The 
Precarious Autonomy of Persistently Vegetative and Brain-Dead Pregnant Women, 22 GA. L. 
REV. 1103, 1106–1112 (1988) (discussing such cases in the context of the principle of bodily 
autonomy). 
22 See Murphy, supra note 21, at 69 (noting that the researcher in one case, who was 
prepared to obtain a court order if any relatives of the brain dead woman tried to intervene, 
stated that the woman had no legal rights and that the bodies of brain-dead women are “the 
cheapest incubators we have”); Jordan, supra note 21, at 1110 n. 25 (comparing the cost of 
neonatal intensive care to the cost of maintaining a pregnant, brain dead woman on life support). 
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B. Uses and Benefits of Artificial Wombs 
Most scientists whose research could lead to ectogenesis are 
focused on developing treatments either for infertility or for the 
complications of premature birth.
23
 Bioethicists and legal 
commentators, however, have identified additional reasons for 
artificial gestation.
24
 These reasons can be briefly stated as: better for 
women, better than surrogacy, better for babies, and better than 
abortion. 
If artificial wombs were widely available, they could release the 
women who used them from the risks and burdens of even normal 
pregnancy, without transferring those risks to other, lower status 
women.
25
 Artificial wombs could thus serve as a liberating 
                                                                                                                 
23 Ethicists typically cite medically indicated surrogacy as the primary use for artificial 
wombs. This point is known as “the better surrogacy argument” for artificial gestation. See, e.g., 
PETER SINGER & DEANE WELLS, MAKING BABIES: THE NEW SCIENCE AND ETHICS OF 
CONCEPTION 118 (1985) (“Medically speaking, ectogenesis offers an alternative to surrogate 
motherhood for women who are incapable of pregnancy or for whom pregnancy is not 
recommended on medical grounds.”); Rosemarie Tong, Out of Body Gestation: In Whose Best 
Interests?, in ECTOGENESIS, supra note 7, at 59, 70 (“[Because many women value a genetic 
connection with a child,] and because of serious concerns I have about one woman using 
another woman’s body to make a baby for her for money, I am prepared to accept the better 
surrogacy argument in favor of ectogenesis.”). 
24 All of the uses for artificial wombs described in the text involve producing children. In 
addition, artificial wombs could be used to create stem cells, organs, and other spare parts, 
rather than for the complete gestation of a new person. This might be feasible on a part-by-part 
basis, or it might require the intentional creation of brain dead, but otherwise complete, 
individuals. See SINGER & WELLS, supra note 23, at 132–35 (describing and partially rejecting 
this potential use of artificial womb technology). Singer and Wells argue that embryos could be 
used for these purposes as long as they are not yet in any way sentient. Id. at 133. On the 
prospect of creating intentionally brain dead babies to circumvent that barrier, they acknowledge 
that this would be permissible under their utilitarian framework but “emphatically urge caution” 
because of the potential collateral effects on people’s ability to bond with infants. Id. at 133. For 
a more detailed discussion that concludes with a more emphatic rejection of this path, see 
COLEMAN, supra note 7, at 163–65 (arguing against the use of partial ectogenesis to develop 
organs for transplant because “none of the usual justifications for killing a fetus seem to apply 
. . . ”). 
If artificial womb research is pursued, therapeutic and research uses would likely become 
feasible before complete ectogenesis is possible. Technically, the “spare parts” endeavor does 
not require an artificial womb; a live woman could work just as well. Presumably, not enough 
women would be willing to serve in this capacity for it to become widespread. See Raskin & 
Mazor, supra note 13, at 166 (“[C]onsidering that the in vitro fetus is no longer protected by the 
natural shield of a female womb, it is further exposed to the scientific hunger for research than 
the in vivo fetus.”). A woman might be willing to do so, however, if it were herself, her own 
child, or another family member who was in need of tissue or a transplant, or in desperate 
financial circumstances. Cf. Fazal Kahn & Brian Lea, Paging King Solomon: Towards Allowing 
Parents to Donate Organs of Anencephalic Infants, 6 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 17, 17–19 (2009) 
(discussing the use of anencephalic infants as organ donors and proposing a ban on the 
intentional creation of anencephalic fetuses). 
25 Contract surrogacy has been criticized for transferring the risks of pregnancy to lower 
status women. See, e.g., Dorothy E. Roberts, Spiritual and Menial Housework, 9 YALE J.L. & 
FEMINISM 51, 65–68 (1997) (discussing the implications of turning pregnancy into a form of 
menial labor and arguing that “[c]ontract pregnancy treats women as objects rather than 
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technology for women. Shulamith Firestone promoted this view when 
she famously called pregnancy “barbaric” and looked forward to the 
day when technology would free women from the physical demands 
of reproduction.
26
 She believed that sex equality would not be 
possible until technology equalized the sexes when it came to making 
babies.
27
 Importantly, Firestone did not believe that the technology of 
artificial gestation, standing alone, would be liberating; she advocated 
a radical restructuring of society, including the abolition of the family 
as an institution, with freedom from pregnancy only one factor 
supporting women’s equality.28 Other feminist writers, however, have 
more directly hailed reproductive technology as a path to sex 
equality.
29
 By diminishing the mother’s role in the creation of a child, 
technology could free women from their disproportionate physical 
burden. It could also put men on an equal footing with women at the 
outset of family life, including by allowing a man to reproduce 
without a female partner or gestational surrogate. 
One criticism of the claim that artificial wombs would be better for 
women is that they would probably be available only to the wealthy. 
Even medically indicated ectogenesis would be available only to the 
relatively well-off, as is true today for expensive treatments for 
neonates and for infertility. That more options are available to those 
with more wealth is, of course, nothing new, so an argument against 
ectogenesis on those grounds is no different from a similar argument 
against any advanced reproductive technology.
30
 Nonetheless, wealth 
                                                                                                                 
 
valuable human beings by selling their capacity to bear children for a price”). 
26 SHULAMITH FIRESTONE, THE DIALECTIC OF SEX: THE CASE FOR FEMINIST 
REVOLUTION 226 (1970). 
27 See id. at 233–34 (emphasis removed) (arguing that women should be free “from the 
tyranny of their reproductive biology by every means available” and discussing “artificial 
reproduction” as one of those means). 
28 See id. at 233–37 (discussing four prerequisites for an alternative system favoring 
women’s equality); see also Murphy, supra note 21, at 78 (arguing that Singer and Wells’s 
claim that the technology would be liberating “ignores the theory of revolution implicit in 
Firestone’s support for ectogenesis”). 
29 See, e.g., Marjorie Maguire Shultz, Reproductive Technology and Intent-Based 
Parenthood: An Opportunity for Gender Neutrality, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 297, 307–16 (arguing 
that the use of modern reproductive technologies leads to greater individual choice in the child 
bearing process). But see Vernellia R. Randall & Tshaka C. Randall, Built In Obsolescence: The 
Coming End to the Abortion Debate, 4 J. HEALTH & BIOMED. L. 291, 307–09 (2008) (arguing 
that apparent equalization would have disproportionate effects on women, especially poor 
women and women of color). 
30 See LAURA M. PURDY, REPRODUCING PERSONS: ISSUES IN FEMINIST BIOETHICS 229–
30 (1996) (suggesting that pursuing reproductive technology diverts resources from other health 
care needs and is “not just a matter of letting the wealthy decide how to use their disposable 
income”); Joan Woolfrey, Ectogenesis: Liberation, Technological Tyranny, or Just More of the 
Same?, in ECTOGENESIS, supra note 7, at 129, 130–33 (arguing that ethical issues regarding 
resource allocation weigh heavily against pursuit of artificial womb technology). But see 
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disparities are a strong counterpoint to claims that artificial gestation 
would benefit women as a class. Practices that allow well-off women 
to buy their way out of femaleness tend to reinforce rather than 
undermine gender-based hierarchy, usually while also reinforcing 
class- and race-based hierarchies.
31
 As Firestone herself recognized, 
liberation requires social transformation in which technology can 
serve only as a tool, not as the transformation itself. 
Wealthy women today can use surrogacy to liberate themselves 
from the burdens of pregnancy. Some bioethicists and legal 
commentators argue that artificial wombs would be better than the 
scantly regulated, globalized surrogacy industry that is currently 
developing.
32
 Those who view paid surrogacy as exploitive or 
otherwise problematic might prefer mechanical gestation.
33
 Although 
poor women might not have access to the technology for themselves, 
at least they would no longer be induced to undertake the burdens and 
risks of pregnancy only to renounce the resulting child pursuant to a 
commercial contract. On the other hand, those who view contract 
surrogacy as legitimate or desirable might worry about the loss of this 
potential source of income for poor women.
34
 The relationship 
between artificial gestation and human surrogacy is discussed in more 
detail in Part III.B. 
Proponents of artificial wombs have also argued that artificial 
gestation would be safer for the fetus under a range of circumstances. 
Some of these proposals predictably reflect long-standing debates 
about control of pregnant women, suggesting that women who are 
                                                                                                                 
 
COLEMAN, supra note 7, at 38–41 (responding to the resource allocation objection to 
reproductive technology). 
31 See ROTHMAN, supra note 16, at 206 (stating that “[p]oor women, women of color, are 
often valued for their nurturant qualities”); Roberts, supra note 25, at 66–67 (discussing racial 
implications of surrogacy). 
32 See Kimberly D. Krawiec, Altruism and Intermediation in the Market for Babies, 66 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 203, 225 (2009) (stating that “surrogacy is increasingly being outsourced 
overseas”); Richard F. Storrow, Parenthood by Pure Intention: Assisted Reproduction and the 
Functional Approach to Parentage, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 597, 597 (2002) (stating that “[a]ssisted 
reproduction is widely used in this country and around the world . . . .”); Mike Celizic, More 
and More Couples Finding Surrogates in India, MSNBC, 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/23252624/print/displaymode/1098 (last updated Feb. 20, 2008) 
(“[C]ouples from the United States and elsewhere are increasingly turning to India for the 
ultimate outsource—surrogate mothers.”); infra Part III.B.1 (discussing the globalization of 
surrogacy). 
33 See, e.g., Tong, supra note 23, at 70 (“[Because many women value a genetic 
connection with a child,] and because of serious concerns I have about one woman using 
another woman’s body to make a baby for her for money, I am prepared to accept the better 
surrogacy argument in favor of ectogenesis.”). 
34 See Krawiec, supra note 32, at 245 (arguing that “legal rules limiting direct surrogate 
access to the marketplace increase the power imbalance between surrogate and intermediary”). 
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addicted to drugs or have other particular problems could be required 
to transfer their fetuses to artificial wombs.
35
 Others have gone so far 
as to posit that ectogenesis would be safer for the fetus as a general 
matter, regardless of the mother’s condition.36 Artificial gestation 
would protect the fetus from various dangers, including irresponsible 
maternal behavior and “dietary fads” among pregnant women.37 The 
fetus would be nurtured in a scientifically controlled environment, 
with exactly the right kinds and amounts of sustenance and 
stimulation. 
These proposals for artificial gestation resonate with a prevailing 
cultural view of pregnant women as threats to their fetuses, a view 
that has been thoroughly critiqued in feminist legal literature.
38
 In the 
context of ectogenesis, perhaps the most important critique is of the 
arrogance of both the medical and legal establishments about what 
they think they know. Many “dietary fads” among pregnant women 
and mothers—say, the “fad” for formula over breast milk, or the 
epidemic of cesarean sections in American hospitals—originate with 
                                                                                                                 
35 See, e.g., Pence, supra note 11, at 82 (discussing women with drug addictions and HIV 
infection). 
36 See id. at 82 (arguing that ectogenesis would allow for “careful monitoring and study of 
the best possible nutrients for the fetus”) (emphasis in the original); Amel Alghrani, The Legal 
and Ethical Ramifications of Ectogenesis, 2 ASIAN J. WTO & INT’L HEALTH L. & POL’Y 189, 
205 (2007) (quoting Edward Grossman, The Obsolescent Mother: A Scenario, THE ATLANTIC, 
May 1971, 39, 48) (“An efficient artificial womb, far from increasing the incidence of birth 
defects, would reduce them by keeping the [fetus] in an absolutely safe and regular environment 
. . . .”) (emphasis omitted). 
37 Emily Jackson, Degendering Reproduction, 16 MED. L. REV. 346, 360 (2008) (quoting 
ROGER GOSDEN, DESIGNER BABIES: THE BRAVE NEW WORLD OF REPRODUCTIVE 
TECHNOLOGY 179 (Phoenix 2000) (1999)) (criticizing the view that fetuses need to be protected 
from their mothers as a general matter); see also Scott Gelfand, Ectogenesis and the Ethics of 
Care, in ECTOGENESIS, supra note 7, at 89, 102 (arguing that it is reasonable to assume that 
ectogenesis would be healthier for both the mother and the child and “would in all likelihood 
protect the fetus from second-hand smoke, alcohol, and an unhealthy diet”). 
38 See Jackson, supra note 37, at 360–61 (applying those critiques in the context of 
ectogenesis); see also, e.g., April Cherry, Maternal-Fetal Conflicts, The Social Construction of 
Maternal Deviance, and Some Thoughts About Love and Justice, 8 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 245, 
257 (1999) (“If we really loved women and cared about justice for them, we would be more apt 
to respect their bodies, their self-determination, and their choices, even when we don’t agree 
with the choices made.”); Dorothy E. Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts Who Have Babies: 
Women of Color, Equality, and the Right to Privacy, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1419, 1482 (1991) 
(“The first principle of the government’s response to the crisis of drug-exposed babies should be 
the recognition of their mothers’ worth and entitlement to autonomy over their reproductive 
lives”); Reva Siegel, Reasoning From the Body: A Historical Perspective on Abortion 
Regulation and Questions of Equal Protection, 44 STAN. L. REV. 261, 342 (1992) (arguing that 
“selective regulation of women’s conduct is justified on the grounds that pregnant women have 
a unique physical capacity to harm children, when the regulation may in fact reflect the view 
that pregnant women have a unique social obligation to protect children”); Dawn E. Johnsen, 
Note, The Creation of Fetal Rights: Conflicts with Women’s Constitutional Rights to Liberty, 
Privacy, and Equal Protection, 95 YALE L.J. 599, 600 (1986) (“Any legal recognition of the 
fetus should be scrutinized to ensure that it does not infringe on women’s constitutionally 
protected interests in liberty and equality during pregnancy.”). 
 4/12/2012 10:01:02 AM 
412 CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62:2 
the medical industry and are reinforced by the legal system.
39
 Barbara 
Katz Rothman explains the risks of relying on mass-scale, 
technological solutions to complex and difficult questions about 
creating and sustaining life: 
We cannot know who will be right, but we do know that, 
inevitably, anyone making these decisions will sometimes be 
wrong. To me, it comes down not to whose judgment we 
trust, but whose mistakes. . . . 
Why, then, do I trust the idiosyncratic mistakes of parents? 
Precisely because they are idiosyncratic. The mistakes of 
medicine and those of the state are systematic, and that alone 
is reason not to trust.
40
 
A downside of a perfectly controlled, scientifically calibrated 
environment for producing babies is that whatever mistakes are made 
will be made on a large scale. For these reasons, claims that artificial 
wombs should be welcomed because they will produce a superior 
product should be greeted with skepticism. 
Even if ectogenesis is not preferable to natural gestation, it might 
be good enough to serve as an alternative to abortion. In the case of 
medically necessary abortions, the artificial alternative would be 
analogous to neonatal care. In addition, some women who today 
might give birth and place their children for adoption might prefer an 
earlier divestiture. For example, a woman who was opposed to 
abortion but became pregnant through rape might find the alternative 
                                                                                                                 
39 See Fejes v. Gilpin Ventures, Inc., 960 F. Supp. 1487, 1491–92 (D. Colo. 1997) 
(holding that breastfeeding is not a medical condition related to pregnancy and therefore, it is 
not within the scope of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act); Tong, supra note 23, at 65–66 
(summarizing the history of the medical establishment’s assertion of control over pregnancy, 
including telling pregnant women “when to eat, sleep, exercise, have sex, and the like”); Beth 
A. Burkstrand-Reid, The Invisible Woman: Availability and Culpability in Reproductive Health 
Jurisprudence, 81 U. COLO. L. REV. 97, 140–46 (2010) (summarizing cases of court-ordered c-
sections); April L. Cherry, Roe’s Legacy: The Nonconsensual Medical Treatment of Pregnant 
Women and the Implications for Female Citizenship, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 723, 736–39 (2004) 
(discussing the negative impacts of nonconsensual medical treatment on women); Linda C. 
Fentiman, Marketing Mothers' Milk: The Commodification of Breastfeeding and the New 
Markets for Breast Milk and Infant Formula, 10 NEV. L.J. 29, 36–38 (2009) (describing the 
medical industry’s promotion of formula over breastfeeding); see also N.J. Div. of Youth and 
Family Servs. v. V.M., 974 A.2d 448, 449 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2009) (per curiam) 
(affirming, on other grounds, decision by trial court declaring mother unfit and removing her 
child because she had refused a c-section recommended by her doctor, even though the baby, 
delivered vaginally, was unharmed). The V.M court affirmed the ruling of the lower court, but 
declined to rule on whether the mother’s refusal to undergo a c-section could be considered as 
evidence of neglect. Id. 
40 ROTHMAN, supra note 16, at 193. 
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of artificial gestation to be an acceptable compromise.
41
 For the most 
part, however, writers who posit artificial gestation as an alternative 
to abortion contemplate outlawing abortion and requiring women 
instead to undergo a fetal extraction and transfer procedure.
42
 This 
idea is discussed in detail in Part III.A. 
Of these four possible reasons for building artificial wombs, the 
first two—“better for women” and “better than surrogacy”—
contemplate the voluntary use of technology by prospective parents. 
Coercion could still be a concern; for instance, employers might 
become more reluctant to allow maternity leave when a substitute 
womb is available, or social norms might come to condemn natural 
gestation as animalistic.
43
 The second two—“better for babies” and 
“better than abortion”—are more explicitly aimed at overriding 
women’s decisions. Although some women might choose artificial 
gestation for these reasons, proponents of these rationales 
contemplate the coercive removal of embryos and fetuses from 
women’s bodies to be gestated by machine.44 
C. Technological Prospects 
Since at least the 1920s, scientists have claimed that the 
technological capacity for ectogenesis is imminent,
45
 but the years 
                                                                                                                 
41 This is assuming that the victim did not want to raise the resulting child. See generally 
Shauna R. Prewitt, Note, Giving Birth to a ‘Rapist's Child’: A Discussion and Analysis of the 
Limited Legal Protections Afforded to Women Who Become Mothers Through Rape, 98 GEO. 
L.J. 827 (2010) (examining state laws related to women who become pregnant as a result of 
rape).  
42 See, e.g., SINGER & WELLS, supra note 23, at 119–120 (discussing the implications of 
ectogenesis on the need for and debate over abortions). 
43 See, Gelfand, supra note 37, at 98–103 (discussing problems involving employers and 
insurance); ALDOUS HUXLEY, BRAVE NEW WORLD 1–19 (Harper & Bros. 1946) (1932) 
(describing a futuristic society in which humans are gestated outside the body in hatcheries). 
44 See, e.g., SINGER & WELLS, supra note 23, at 126 (discussing common objections to 
ectogenesis) (arguing that ectogenesis would be beneficial because it would “eliminate the 
wastage of embryonic life now caused by abortion” and would “reduce the possessiveness of 
natural mothers”). 
45 See Tong, supra note 23, at 60–61 (citing SUSAN MERRILL SQUIER, BABIES IN 
BOTTLES: TWENTIETH-CENTURY VISIONS OF REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY (1994)) (discussing 
theories on ectogenesis in the 1920s). The earliest documented claim for artificial gestation was 
a sixteenth-century recipe for creating a human form by allowing a man’s semen to putrefy in 
the sealed womb of a horse. The resulting creature, however, was believed to lack a soul. 
Gelfand, supra note 7, at 3. Interest in and anticipation of ectogenesis has come in cycles, with a 
spate of interest in the 1920s, another in the late 1970s and early 1980s, and the current cycle, 
which began around the turn of the millennium. See Tong, supra note 23, at 60–67 (describing 
the three periods). These cycles are reflected in spurts of interest in ectogenesis in law reviews 
in the late 1970s and again in the last five years. See Alghrani, supra note 36, 192–208 
(focusing on the science behind ectogenesis as well as the legal implications); Michael Buckley, 
Note, Current Technology Affecting Supreme Court Abortion Jurisprudence, 27 N.Y.L. SCH. L. 
REV. 1221, 1239–49 (1982) (discussing the possible effects of ectogenetic technology on the 
Supreme Court’s abortion jurisprudence); Jackson, supra note 37, at 356–65 (discussing the 
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come and go and no artificial wombs are built. Great progress has 
been made in both embryonic research and care for premature infants. 
Recent anticipation of ectogenesis among ethicists and legal scholars, 
however, appears to be overly optimistic. 
Non-biologists writing about law or ethics, rather than scientists, 
have made the most frequent announcements of imminent 
ectogenesis.
46
 Recent popular and academic discussions of the advent 
of artificial wombs typically cite the same two researchers, Dr. 
Yoshinori Kuwabara of Juntendo University, Tokyo and Dr. Hung-
Ching Liu of Cornell University.
47
 Dr. Kuwabara’s research 
approached ectogenesis from the direction of fetal survival, trying to 
push back the point of viability for premature babies. He predicted in 
1997 that partial ectogenesis—from the sixteenth week of 
pregnancy—would be possible in about ten years.48 Dr. Liu worked 
from the other direction, developing techniques for maintaining 
embryos and encouraging them to implant in artificial environments. 
She, too, has predicted that her techniques would lead to complete 
artificial wombs within a few years.
49
 Both of these lines of research 
                                                                                                                 
 
potential effect of ectogenesis on gender roles in the reproductive process); Randall & Randall, 
supra note 29, at 293 (arguing that emerging medical technology will essentially end the debate 
over abortion by allowing a woman to choose to terminate a pregnancy without terminating the 
life of the fetus); Goldstein, supra note 13, at 891–98 (discussing the effect of ectogenesis on 
the concept of viability); Martyn, supra note 13, at 1202–14 (discussing potential changes in the 
law influenced by developments in ectogenetic technology); Jessica H. Schultz, Note, 
Development of Ectogenesis: How Will Artificial Wombs Affect the Legal Status of a Fetus or 
Embryo?, 84 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 877, 883–901 (2010) (discussing a number of legal issues 
related to ectogenesis); Eric Steiger, Note, Not of Woman Born: How Ectogenesis Will Change 
the Way We View Viability, Birth, and the Status of the Unborn, 23 J.L. & HEALTH 143, 158–63 
(2010) (discussing ways in the law could adapt to accommodate ectogenetic technology).  
46 See, e.g., Gelfand, supra note 7, at 1 (stating that “it is likely that an artificial womb 
designed for human use will be developed in the near future . . . ”); SINGER & WELLS, supra 
note 23, at 116–118 (discussing scientific prosects for ectogenesis); Goldstein, supra note 13, at 
880 (stating that “[p]ractical applications of [ectogenesis] may occur in the very near future . . . 
”); Martyn, supra note 133, at 1204 (speculating that “[i]f technological improvements move to 
the point of viability to a time within the first twelve weeks of pregnancy” that the state’s 
interest in protecting the fetus will attach during that period); Steiger, supra note 45, at 144 
(stating that “[s]cientists predict that safe, reliable, and complete ectogenesis will be available 
within the next thirty years, and perhaps within as little as ten or five”).. 
47 See COLEMAN, supra note 7, at 11–12 (discussing the work of Dr. Kuwabara); 
Alghrani, supra note 36, at 194–95 (discussing the work of Dr. Kuwabara and Dr. Liu); 
Jackson, supra note 37, at 358 (referring to Dr. Liu); Randall & Randall, supra note 29, at 297–
98 (discussing the work of Dr. Kuwabara and Dr. Liu); Schultz, supra note 45, at 881–82 
(discussing the work of Dr. Kuwabara and referring to the work of Dr. Liu). 
48 See Gelfand, supra note 7, at 2 (“In 1997, Kuwabara believed that it would take about 
ten years to develop an artificial womb that could be used to bring a sixteen-week fetus to 
term.”). 
49 See id. (relating Liu’s prediction). 
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are provocative enough to have captured press attention 
periodically.
50
 
Indeed, their work continues to be cited even though Dr. 
Kuwabara died in 2000 and Dr. Liu has not published her results.
51
 
This pattern suggests that the level of popular and intellectual 
fascination with artificial wombs is out of proportion to their 
technological feasibility. 
None of that, of course, means that artificial gestation is 
impossible. Technical barriers to creating artificial wombs can be 
thought of as falling into two categories: life support barriers and 
developmental barriers. The phrase “life support barriers” refers to 
the difficulties involved in artificially performing the ordinary bodily 
functions that the developing fetus cannot yet do for itself. These are 
familiar from neonatal intensive care: the body must have 
mechanisms for absorbing oxygen, taking in nutrients, and expelling 
waste. The phrase “developmental barriers” refers to difficulties in 
directing the growth of a fertilized egg so that it correctly follows the 
path from embryo to fetus to healthy infant. 
This dichotomy between life support barriers and developmental 
barriers is, however, artificial. In natural gestation, the uterus 
performs both life support and developmental functions, and it would 
be difficult to draw a clear line between the two categories. My 
distinction between the two categories is intended only to draw 
attention to a feature of the legal and ethical literature of artificial 
wombs. In that literature, discussions of the technological prospects 
for ectogenesis tend to focus on the life support barriers that are 
familiar from neonatal care. While they acknowledge the concern that 
artificially gestated fetuses will experience developmental problems, 
                                                                                                                 
50 Those of us who are interested in the legal and ethical problems of artificial 
reproduction may be eager to seize on the promise of technological imminence. For example, 
Stephen Coleman’s book devoted to ectogenesis canvasses the state of current research in the 
field. COLEMAN, supra note 7, at 5–14. His survey includes the usual citations to the work of 
Dr. Kuwabara, as well as an embryo study by Dr. Carlo Bulletti in Bologna. Id. at 11–13. The 
only other current research cited is what Coleman describes as “the patented theoretical work of 
Dr. William Cooper,” as evidenced by a 1991 patent application for a “placental chamber.” Id. 
at 12. As best as can be determined, Dr. Cooper is an obstetrician with no apparent research 
credentials who practiced in Tulsa, Oklahoma under the business name Christian Fertility 
Institute. According to the website of the Oklahoma Medical Board, his license was revoked in 
1998 following disciplinary actions in Georgia and Pennsylvania for “[f]ailure to provide a 
proper setting and assistive personnel for medical act,” “[f]raud [o]btaining [l]icense 
[c]redentials,” and “[u]nprofessional [c]onduct.” OKLA. BD. OF MED. LICENSURE AND 
SUPERVISION, www.okmedicalboard.org/licensee/MD/15621 (last updated Feb. 13, 2012). 
51 See Alghrani, supra note 36, at 194 (noting Dr. Kuwabara’s death and that Dr. Liu’s 
work was unpublished). A member of Dr. Kuwabara’s research team stated that their approach 
might be able to push the point of viability back to twenty weeks but that he personally had no 
plans to pursue that line of research. See id. Twenty weeks is only slightly earlier than the 
current survival point for premature birth. See supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
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they generally do not treat embryo development as one of the 
functions of the uterus; the implicit assumption is that if the life 
support functions are performed correctly, proper development will 
occur. Part II argues that this implicit assumption reflects a long-
standing ideological view of gestation that is likely inconsistent with 
the scientific facts. 
From a life support perspective, a successful artificial womb 
would have to be able to perform the functions of the placenta, as 
well as protect the fetus with something akin to amniotic fluid.
52
 
Neonatologists have had greatest success when they approach such 
tasks in a manner that mimics ordinary gestation, rather than treating 
the newborn as one would treat a fully developed infant.
53
 For 
example, doctors provide nutrition to very premature infants 
intravenously, rather than relying on their incomplete digestive 
systems.
54
 Similarly, premature infants’ fragile skin is protected by a 
moist environment or even by creams that can mimic amniotic fluid.
55
 
In these respects, current technology foreshadows artificial wombs by 
mimicking the natural womb in form as well as function. 
The exception to this pattern is the provision of oxygen.
56
 Rather 
than mimic the placenta by supplying oxygen through the 
bloodstream, doctors treat premature babies with high-frequency 
ventilators.
57
 This approach requires additional treatment to 
encourage the lungs to develop as quickly as possible.
58
 Although in 
the past there has been research on how to provide oxygen through 
the bloodstream, the techniques that were developed failed to out-
perform ventilators.
59
 The need for sufficient lung development to 
tolerate a ventilator is thus the most important factor in setting the 
current limit of fetal viability.
60
 
                                                                                                                 
52 COLEMAN, supra note 7, at 7 (“The amniotic fluid acts to regulate foetal temperature, to 
prevent dehydration, and as a barrier to infection.”). 
53 See id. (“When treating extremely premature newborns, neonatologists attempt to 
mimic the uterine function when treating problems of these types.”). 
54 See id. at 7–8 (discussing the delivery of nutrition to premature infants). 
55 See id. at 8 (“The immaturity of the skin of the premature infant is also a problem that 
the neonatologist must deal with.”). 
56 See id. at 9 (“The treatment of respiratory problems in premature infants is clearly quite 
different from the treatment of most other problems, as the treatment relies exclusively on the 
body system that is responsible for oxygenation of the blood after birth; the lungs.”). 
57 Id. at 8–9. 
58 See id. at 9 (describing surfactant replacement therapy, which is used with a ventilator 
to “help the lungs absorb oxygen”). 
59 Id. at 9–11 (describing research into artificial placentas in the 1950s and 1960s and 
finding that “attempts to keep the subject attached to the artificial placenta for longer periods 
inevitably resulted in death”). 
60 See Pence, supra note 11, at 85 (“For thirty years, viability of lungs of the premature 
baby has been the absolute barrier to progress towards an artificial womb. Reports of success 
using liquids to substitute for the mother’s placenta have usually been exaggerated.”); see also 
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Given the difficulties of artificially recreating the uterine 
environment in order to sustain a mid-term fetus, it almost begins to 
look easier to rely on natural processes by initiating the pregnancy in 
vitro and allowing the mechanisms for sustaining the fetus to develop 
organically. If an embryo could implant in an artificial container that 
behaved like a womb, the blood vessels and other connections 
necessary for sustaining life could grow themselves. In this scenario, 
the difficulty would lie in directing fetal development: the artificial 
womb would have to deliver the correct hormones and growth factors 
at the correct times.
61
 This developmental challenge, however, has 
received little attention in the popular, ethical, and legal literature 
about artificial gestation, which focuses on life-support issues.
62
 
There is an underlying assumption that providing the proper climate 
and nutrition will enable the embryo’s development to unfold 
naturally and of its own accord. As Part II will show, this assumption 
is more ideological than scientific. 
Contemplating artificial gestation from a developmental 
perspective also has important implications for ethical barriers to this 
sort of research. When the focus of research is on life support 
measures for saving premature infants, there are opportunities for 
doctors to experiment with new methods. If an infant is certain to die 
without intervention, researchers can attempt even an untested 
technique. Through this process, the technique may become tested.
63
 
By contrast, experimentation is more fraught when it attempts to 
make a baby from scratch and simulate the maternal—fetal signaling 
that shapes development. Errors may or may not be detectable 
immediately and could result in seriously damaged children. 
Even if developmental barriers were overcome, at least some of 
the proposed uses for artificial wombs would require more 
sophisticated technology. For example, in order for artificial gestation 
to substitute for abortion, scientists would have to recreate placental 
connections once the original placenta has been severed from the 
                                                                                                                 
 
supra note 11 (describing the difficulties associated with providing oxygen to premature lungs). 
61 See Jackson, supra note 37, at 358 (describing Dr. Liu’s research agenda and explaining 
that directing the development of organs in the early embryo would be “an exceptionally 
complex task”). 
62 See, e.g., COLEMAN, supra note 7, at 5–13 (describing life-support issues in detail 
without mentioning hormonal or other developmental processes as background to a book on the 
ethics of artificial gestation). 
63 This is not to suggest that ethical decisions about the treatment of imperiled newborns 
are easy ones. See, e.g., Cohen & Sayeed, supra note 10, at 236–37 (reporting that the few 
infants who survive being born before twenty-three weeks gestation are likely to suffer serious 
impairments). They are, however, beyond the scope of this article. 
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natural womb. They would also have to develop techniques for safely 
removing the embryo or fetus from the pregnant woman. In order for 
artificial wombs to be a plausible alternative to most abortions in the 
United States, these techniques would have to be usable in the first 
trimester.
64
 At this stage, the embryo or fetus is already embedded in 
the uterus but is still quite small and not highly differentiated, both of 
which would make locating and transferring it difficult. 
In the end, the best argument for the likelihood of ectogenesis is 
generalized faith in scientific progress and capacity: science has 
accomplished many things that would have been thought impossible 
before they were done; why should this be any different?
65
 That is not 
an argument, however, for expecting the technology to be available in 
the near future. As Part II discusses, optimistic predictions about the 
imminence of artificial womb technology are probably exaggerated 
by the gender bias that has historically plagued reproductive science. 
II. THE FANTASY AS A DREAM DIARY 
A dream diary is a journal in which a person records her dreams, 
usually for the purpose of gaining insight into her own psychological 
state and processes. The practice of keeping a dream diary is based on 
the theory that our dreams reflect and reveal our psyches. This Part 
situates the science of artificial wombs in the history of reproductive 
science and argues that the legal/scientific fantasy about artificial 
gestation can be read as a dream diary, reflecting and revealing a 
prevailing ideology about sex, gender, and reproduction. 
Feminist scientists and philosophers of science have demonstrated 
how sex-based ideology has frequently skewed and hampered 
scientific efforts to understand the biology of reproduction. In 
particular, since Aristotle, philosophers and scientists have theorized 
reproduction through a series of related dichotomies that minimize the 
role of gestation: the physical versus the spiritual or cognitive; the 
passive versus the active; the female versus the male; and the 
pregnant woman versus the fetus. Relying on these dichotomies—and 
despite what might seem overwhelming evidence to the contrary—
scientists long theorized men’s role in reproduction as greater and 
more important than women’s, particularly minimizing the role of 
gestation. 
                                                                                                                 
64 See sources cited supra notes 13–15. 
65 See, e.g., Gelfand, supra note 7, at 1 (noting that the first successful cloning of a sheep 
took many scientists by surprise); Alghrani, supra note 36, at 192 (invoking this reason for 
expecting success with ectogenesis). 
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Only in the last century or so has women’s lesser contribution (and 
general inferiority) ceased to be an axiom of scientific inquiry.
66
 The 
relaxation of that axiom has coincided with, and gradually enabled, 
better science. Nonetheless, early assumptions die hard. The 
scientific, legal, and ethical speculations about ectogenesis reflect the 
same dichotomies and biases that have long plagued reproductive 
science. It is therefore likely that the prospects for building artificial 
wombs are systematically overstated. 
A. From Ancient Times: Theorizing Reproduction Through Aristotle’s 
Dichotomies 
Western reproductive science begins with Aristotle, whose model 
of conception is reminiscent of Genesis.
67
 Just as God formed Adam 
from the dust of the earth, Aristotle believed that a man’s semen 
contained the motive force that acted upon the raw materials 
contained in a woman to form a new being.
68
 His model thus 
established two dichotomies as the basic framework for 
understanding reproduction: one between the active male and the 
passive female, and another between the immaterial life force of the 
man and the physical body of the woman. Although some other 
classical theorists believed that both parents contributed to fetal 
development, “they uniformly held that woman’s contribution was 
weaker than that of man.”69Aristotle’s model of reproduction is 
considered “epigenetic,” in that it supposes the embryo to be “newly 
produced through gradual development from unorganized material.”70 
The organizing motive force comes from the outside and gives form 
to the raw materials.  
Epigenetic models of reproduction fell out of favor in the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries because they appeared to require 
a non-mechanical, spiritual force to mold the new being. 
Enlightenment scientific theory favored the clockwork universe.
71
 
The epigenetic theory of reproduction was, therefore, replaced by 
                                                                                                                 
66 Cf. Nancy Tuana, The Weaker Seed: The Sexist Bias of Reproductive Theory, 3 
HYPATIA, Spring 1988, at 35, 41 (1988) (“We can see from such inconsistencies in Aristotle’s 
theory that the doctrine that the female sex was inferior to the male was not a premise to be 
proved or justified, but was rather an implicit belief underlying Aristotle’s development of his 
biological theory and an axiom upon which he founded his theory of reproduction.”). 
67 See id. at 38 (making this comparison). 
68 See id. at 38–40 (summarizing Artistotle’s writings on reproduction). 
69 Id. at 41. 
70 SHIRLEY A. ROE, MATTER, LIFE, AND GENERATION: EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY 
EMBRYOLOGY AND THE HALLER-WOLFF DEBATE 1 (1981). 
71 See id. at 8–9 (describing the conceptual problems with explaining epigenesis within 
the framework of a mechanical universe); Tuana, supra note 66, at 51 (linking preformationism 
to belief in the clockwork universe). 
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“preformation” doctrine.72 Preformationists believed that fetal 
development consisted solely of the “growth or unfolding of pre-
existing structures . . . .”73 
Originally, preformationists believed that the form of the fetus was 
contained within the mother’s egg and that the father’s semen 
provided the trigger to stimulate growth.
74
 It followed that an egg 
contained a series of Russian nesting dolls, with all the generations of 
humanity contained originally in Eve’s eggs. This “ovist” view of 
reproduction, however, was “almost uniformly rejected” once sperm 
was observed and recognized as the male analogue to the egg.
75
 The 
pre-existing fetus was quickly transferred to the sperm. A famous 
eighteenth-century illustration of the preformationist view depicts a 
tiny man squatting in the head of a sperm, his own head either 
replaced by or enclosed in an oversized bulge.
76
 This small creature 
was believed to take root and grow in the mother “just as the seed 
does in the field.”77 
Female inferiority continued to function as an axiom to justify 
preformationist theory. Erasmus Darwin, grandfather of Charles and a 
proponent of preformation, held “that the embryon is produced by the 
male, and the proper food and nidus by the female.”78 As support for 
his view that the female contributes no part of the embryo, he offered 
a proof by contradiction: If the female as well as the male helped to 
constitute the embryo, then the female’s overall contribution would 
be greater than the male’s; she would give both form and nutrition, he 
only form. That cannot be. QED.
79
 The pre-existing embryo thus 
assumed the role of Aristotle’s motive force, while the pregnant 
                                                                                                                 
72 See Tuana, supra note 66, at 51 (“The idea of an evolution of complexity from 
unstructured material lost favor toward the end of the seventeenth century as a result of the 
general scientific commitment to a mechanistic worldview and the insufficiency of mechanical 
explanations of the gradual development of living organisms.”). See also ROE, supra note 70, at 
4 (describing Rene Descartes’s unsuccessful effort to reconcile an epigenetic theory of 
reproduction with a mechanistic, particle-based theory of matter); id. at 23 (noting that Albrecht 
von Haller, an eighteenth-century embryologist, believed that “almost everyone” believed in 
preformation). Haller himself started as a preformationist, briefly converted to epigenesist, and 
ended his life a staunch defender of preformation. Id. at 22–25. 
73 Tuana, supra note 66, at 51. 
74 Id. at 52. 
75 Id. at 52–53. The ovist view was briefly revived in the mid-1700s by a few 
embryologists who objected to the inefficiency of “animalculism,” the term for the theory that 
located the pre-existing embryo in sperm. Id. at 52–54. See also ROE, supra note 70, at 9 (noting 
that preformation was widely accepted by the beginning of the eighteenth century, and that 
animasculism was a minority viewpoint). 
76 To view this illustration, see Tuana, supra note 66, at 54. 
77 Id. at 55 (quoting Martin Frobenius Ledermuller). 
78 Id. at 55–56 (quoting ERASMUS DARWIN, ZOONOMIA, OR THE LAWS OF ORGANIC LIFE 
(AMS Press 1974). 
79 Id. at 55. 
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woman remained a source of nutrients and other raw materials for 
sustaining growth. The dichotomy between these two parental 
contributions remained intact. 
B. The Modern Era: Preformation and Genetic Determinism  
Scientific discoveries can be hard on human sensibilities. Sigmund 
Freud explained: 
In the course of centuries the naïve self-love of men has had 
to submit to two major blows at the hands of science. The 
first was when they learnt that our earth was not the centre of 
the universe but only a tiny fragment of a cosmic system of 
scarcely imaginable vastness. . . . The second blow fell when 
biological research destroyed man’s supposedly privileged 
place in creation and proved his descent from the animal 
kingdom and his ineradicable animal nature.
80
 
Freud posited his own theories of the unconscious as the third major 
blow, “prov[ing] to the ego that it is not even master in its own house 
. . . .”81 Few of Freud’s theories having attained a level of scientific 
acceptance equivalent to evolution or the Copernican model, a better 
candidate for the third great blow to man is the discovery of DNA in 
human eggs, which proved that women contributed equally (at least)
82
 
to the genetic makeup of their offspring. 
Preformation theory required that the motive force for a new being 
come from either the mother or the father, since the new being was 
envisioned as already complete. Like the ancients, the 
preformationists assigned the father this role, and they pointed to the 
active, swimming sperm as the vehicle for placing the new being 
inside the passive mother.
83
 With the discovery that genetic coding 
resided in both the sperm and the egg, scientists and society at large 
were forced to accept that women contributed not just raw material 
but also form. 
                                                                                                                 
80 16 SIGMUND FREUD, Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis, in THE STANDARD 
EDITION OF THE COMPLETE PSYCHOLOGICAL WORKS OF SIGMUND FREUD 284–85 (James 
Strachey trans., 1963). 
81 Id. at 285. 
82 In addition to downplaying gestation as discussed in this Part, the popular cultural 
belief that a mother and father contribute equally to a child’s DNA appears to be impervious to 
the discovery of mitochondrial DNA, which comes only from the egg. See W. Nicholson Price, 
Note, Am I My Son? Human Clones and the Modern Family, 11 COLUM SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 
119, 142–43 (2010) (discussing mitochondrial DNA and disputing the “common belief” that 
DNA exists only in the nucleus). 
83 See Tuana, supra note 66, at 52–53 (describing the work of Anthony van Leeuwenhoek 
and Louis Dominicus Hamm which found that “the nourishment of the masculine seed was the 
sole function of the female”). 
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Recall that Darwin’s grandfather rejected this possibility because it 
led to the absurd result of the woman having a greater role in 
reproduction than the man.
84
 But disproof of old-fashioned 
preformation did not mean that the culture was willing to concede that 
greater role; it avoided doing so by translating preformation into 
genetic determinism.
85
 With the new understanding of genetic 
inheritance, the fetus could no longer be thought to have pre-existed 
the pregnancy. Instead, the essence of the fetus was its newly formed 
set of DNA, to which mother and father contributed equally. Thus, 
the fallback position, still in effect today, was to deny that women had 
a greater role in reproduction, and instead to insist on equality by 
further minimizing the importance of gestation and by equating 
biological parenthood with the contribution of nuclear DNA.
86
 As 
Part III discusses, this new theory has had important implications for 
the legal regulation of pregnancy. The egg’s DNA, rather than 
gestation, would now define female parenthood, setting the stage for 
cultural acceptance of phenomena like commercial surrogacy, 
artificial wombs, and the concept of maternal–fetal conflict that 
drives abortion bans and other fetal-protective legislation. 
The continuity between preformation and modern genetic 
determinism can be seen in the metaphors that continue to influence 
our understanding of reproduction today. Preformationists believed 
that the little being inside the sperm “develop[ed] in the mother just 
as the seed does in the field.”87 Into at least the late twentieth century, 
children were taught that babies are made when “Daddy plants a seed 
                                                                                                                 
84 See supra notes 78–79 and accompanying text (outlining Erasmus Darwin’s 
conclusions).   
85 Jane Maienschein has also described the continuity between old-fashioned preformation 
doctrine and modern genetic determinism. See Jane Maienschein, Cloning and Stem Cell 
Debates in the Context of Genetic Determinism, 9 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 565, 
574–75 (2009) (discussing “the preformism of genetic determinism”). After the heyday of 
preformation in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, nineteenth-century scientists returned 
to epigenetic theories. Epigenesis was no longer considered inconsistent with the clockwork 
universe because natural phenomena were understood as intrinsically organized rather than 
amorphous. See ROE, supra note 70, at 150–53 (discussing the rise of teleological epigenesis). 
As discussed below, however, preformation had sufficient hold on popular imagination in the 
United States to play a role in the criminalization of abortion in the nineteenth century. See 
Siegel, supra note 38, at 341–42 n.331–33 (discussing efforts to enact various fetal-protective 
regulations). 
86 See ROTHMAN, supra note 16, at 36–37 (emphasis in the original): 
When forced to acknowledge that a woman’s genetic contribution is equal to a 
man’s, Western patriarchy was in trouble. But the central concept of patriarchy, the 
importance of the seed, was retained by extending the concept to women. . . . Women 
do not gain their rights to their children in this society as mothers, but as father 
equivalents, as equivalent sources of seed. 
87 Tuana supra note 66, at 55 (quoting Martin Froenius Ledermuller). 
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in Mommy.”88 The lay cultural understanding of reproduction, and to 
some extent the scientific understanding, remains rooted in a DNA-
based version of preformation.
 89
 
This continuity extends back to Aristotle and his dichotomy 
between the active, spiritual force of the father and the raw material 
of the mother. In addition, a parallel dichotomy stretches forward to 
shape the cultural construction of childrearing. Barbara Katz Rothman 
and Dorothy Roberts have both described the cultural division of 
mothering work into what Roberts calls “spiritual” and “menial” 
categories.
90
 This division allows privileged women to participate in 
public life while maintaining their identities as mothers; they can 
perform the spiritual role of mothers while hiring lower status women 
to perform the menial tasks.
91
 Rothman points out that this dichotomy 
enables higher status women to assume privileges that are 
traditionally male without challenging the basic structure of privilege 
that orders our gendered experiences of reproduction and care work.
92
 
Today, DNA is thought of as a blueprint or design—something 
more cognitive than physical.
93
 As the design force, it is valued as the 
quasi-spiritual essence of identity and individuality. Once a new set of 
DNA is created in a zygote, it implants in the mother, and its 
developmental process unfolds under the guidance of its own unique 
set of DNA. We think of the fetus’s relationship with “the maternal 
environment” as similar to our own relationship with our 
surroundings. The mother is a source of needed inputs and outputs—
food, oxygen—and protection from certain harms. She provides basic, 
“menial” services. The new being is, however, essentially complete, 
preformed. As Part III discusses, this conception of the embryo as 
                                                                                                                 
88 Barbara Katz Rothman, Daddy Plants a Seed: Personhood Under Patriarchy, 47 
HASTINGS L.J. 1241, 1244 (1996) (“In Western, patriarchal societies, the classic where-do-
babies-come-from tale we tell children is a variation on ‘Daddy plants a seed in Mommy.’”). 
89 See Maienschein, supra note 85, at 575 (pointing out that the public was caught off 
guard by the success of cloning in part because they accepted the genetic determinist 
worldview); id. at 565: 
[T]his emphasis on genetic determinism [by scientists] has reinforced a popular 
misconception that what matters about the life of an individual organism, including 
its form and function, is laid out fully in all relevant respects with fertilization, at the 
time that the full complement of chromosomes comes together from the two parents. 
90 Roberts, supra note 25, at 51–52. 
91 Id. at 57 (“Today, the spiritual/menial split enables many professional women to go to 
work without disturbing the sexual division of housework or relinquishing their role as spiritual 
housekeepers.”). 
92 See ROTHMAN, supra note 16, at 204–06 (describing “managerial mothers” who, like 
men have done previously, leave the nurturing of their babies to other women). 
93 See Maienschein, supra note 85, at 574–75 (“Today . . . the preformism of genetic 
determinism has overbalanced our understanding of complex developmental processes.”). 
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essentially complete, merely waiting to unfold, has important 
implications for the law’s approach to issues such as abortion and 
surrogacy.
94
 It is, however, an overly simplistic and systematically 
skewed model for understanding the creation of a new being. 
C. The New Epigenetics: Science Resists the Dichotomies  
In biology, epigenesis is on the rise once more, challenging and 
complicating the genetic determinism that took hold during the 
twentieth century. Today, the field of epigenetics studies how genes 
interact with environmental factors that influence gene expression—
whether, when, and how particular genes are turned “on” or “off.”95 
Rather than study the individual as a predetermined entity whose 
essence was fixed when the parents’ chromosomes combined, 
biologists study development as a complicated interaction between 
genes and other factors. The environment contributes not just raw 
materials but also form. 
The interaction of genes and the environment breaks down the 
dichotomy between nature and nurture, between the cognitive 
blueprint and the physical implementation of a person. Epigenetics 
also challenges the prevailing cultural view that equates the genetic 
blueprint with parental inheritance and thus the essence of both 
identity and parenthood. The popular view is that genetic inheritance 
is fixed and that environmental factors, even if they operate on the 
genes, affect only the individual. The opposite, however, appears to 
be true. Epigenetic changes in gene expression affect not only the 
individual but also the individual’s descendants. That is, 
environmental factors create heritable effects. Thus, a more formal 
definition of the modern field of epigenetics is “the study of heritable 
changes in gene expression that occur without a change in DNA 
sequence.”96 
For example, one frequently discussed study of epigenetics 
involved the genetic and epigenetic control of the color of a mouse’s 
                                                                                                                 
94 See supra Part III.A–B. 
95 See generally Alan P. Wolffe & Marjori A. Matzke, Epigenetics: Regulation Through 
Repression, 286 SCI. 481 (1999) (examining recent discoveries in the field of epigenetics). For 
descriptions of the field of epigenetics that are written to be understandable by a legal audience, 
see Fazal Khan, Preserving Human Potential as Freedom: A Framework for Regulating 
Epigenetic Harms, 20 HEALTH MATRIX 259, 266–76 (2010) (outlining new developments in the 
field of epigenetics); Maienschein, supra note 85, at 576–80 (describing historical developments 
in epigenetics and stem cell research); Mark A. Rothstein et al., The Ghost in Our Genes: Legal 
and Ethical Implications of Epigenetics, 19 HEALTH MATRIX 1, 4–23 (2009) (describing the 
science of epigenetics).  
96 Wolffe & Matzke, supra note 95, at 481.  
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fur.
97
 The diet of a pregnant mouse can be manipulated so that her 
offspring are either black or yellow, even though they are genetically 
identical. Surprisingly, the difference in color is heritable: it persists 
into the next generation. The effect of the mother’s diet is not “just” a 
matter of an environmental factor affecting a particular offspring; it 
becomes part of the heritable “instructions” that are passed down 
from one generation to the next. A similar process was likely 
responsible for a phenomenon observed in humans after the Dutch 
famine of 1944.
98
 As one might expect, children who were in utero 
during the famine were adversely affected on several health measures. 
Surprisingly, however, the effect persisted into the next generation, 
with the children of the famine babies experiencing high rates of heart 
disease. 
Just as the early version of preformation gave way to more 
nuanced genetic determinism, today’s science is not Aristotle’s 
epigenesis. Epigenetics does not displace the chromosome as the 
primary mechanism of biological inheritance. It does, however, 
challenge genetic determinism and the dichotomy between genes and 
environment. In the context of pregnancy and gestation, it challenges 
the dichotomy between form and matter, between genetic identity and 
the supportive environment of the womb. 
This challenge to the genes–environment dichotomy should not be 
interpreted to mean that gestation is important because it can 
influence genetics. That conclusion would accept not only the 
dichotomy but also the associated valuation of genes over 
environment. It still makes sense to think of DNA as one thing and 
influences on expression as another. It may no longer make sense, 
however, to elevate genes as the higher, true essence of parenthood 
because they influence future generations; the environment, including 
the maternal environment, does that too. Rather, the conceptual 
dichotomy between genes and environment is a cultural construction 
that is often misleading. This dichotomy imagines genes as 
“instructions” or “blueprints,” imbuing them with a cognitive, almost 
spiritual quality. Genes are thus deemed superior to the merely 
physical, including gestation, as a basis for identity. This dichotomy 
is artificial and resonates with other dichotomies that have harmful 
                                                                                                                 
97 See generally Hugh D. Morgan et al., Epigenetic Inheritance at the Agouti Locus in the 
Mouse, 23 NATURE GENETICS 314 (1999) (describing the inheritance of epigenetic 
modifications in mice). For a more accessible explanation, see Barry Starr, Ask a Geneticist, 
THE TECH MUSEUM, (July 26, 2006), http://www.thetech.org/genetics/ask.php?id=183 
(discussing whether surrogate children share genes with the birth mother). 
98 See Starr, supra note 97 (noting that grandchildren of people who suffered in the Dutch 
famine were generally smaller than other children). 
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social effects, including the dichotomy of gender. Chromosomes are 
not, in fact, “blueprints” or “instructions,” to be consulted by a self-
aware builder. They are made of sugar and protein; they are physical, 
tangible stuff. It is helpful, at times, for us to think of them 
metaphorically as design plans, but we should not allow the metaphor 
to replace the reality. Both gestation and the replication of 
chromosomes are physical processes that create us as ourselves. 
The understanding of pregnancy that prevails today was formed 
through the lens of an artificial dichotomy between form and matter. 
In this understanding, the fertilized egg is self-contained and 
complete as a new, individual human being. The DNA in the genes 
provides the blueprint and operating instructions for turning the egg 
into a baby. The mother’s womb provides the raw materials and 
disposes of waste products. The embryo itself is thus self-executing. 
This construction of pregnancy makes an artificial womb seem 
relatively simple in concept, even if technically difficult to carry out. 
The technical problems would arise from complexity and from the 
microscopic scale of early development, but the basic tasks would be 
straightforward life support tasks. 
This vision of fetal development, however, is warped by ideology. 
A gestating woman’s body shapes the fetus’s development in ways 
which cannot be starkly distinguished from genetic inheritance. This 
suggests that we could as easily think of artificial gestation as akin to 
reproduction with synthetic DNA, rather than merely the replacement 
of one machine with another. It is therefore likely that we are 
overestimating the feasibility of artificial wombs because science and 
culture have traditionally discounted the role that gestation plays in 
development. This does not mean that gestation is a mystical process 
that is inherently incapable of mechanization, any more than it is 
inherently impossible to synthesize usable human DNA.
99
 But the 
dichotomy between genes and environment is not as simple as 
popular and legal discussions typically assume. Similarly, gestation is 
more complex and developmental than the traditional view of the 
pregnant woman as a container suggests. The bias that has long 
hampered reproductive science still colors our cultural and scientific 
understanding of gestation and continues to lead us astray. 
III. THE FANTASY MADE REAL 
On the strength of that same long-standing bias, the fantasy of 
artificial gestation has become part of legal discourse about abortion 
                                                                                                                 
99 For a brief discussion of using synthetic DNA for human reproduction, see Jackson, 
supra note 37, at 352–56. 
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and surrogacy. Even if ectogenesis is unlikely to be possible in the 
near or even the foreseeable future, legal analysis is already 
anticipating the possibility and is affected by that anticipation. This 
Part argues that overestimation of the technological capacity for 
artificial gestation is not merely an artifact but also an implement of 
ideology. Part III.A shows how the prospect of artificial gestation taps 
into preformationist assumptions in the debate over abortion. Part 
III.B shows how these same assumptions can influence the law of 
surrogacy and hopes for “better surrogacy” by machine. These 
examples show how the fantasy of artificial gestation—itself the 
product of ideology as much as science—can help to maintain its own 
ideological reality even before science can provide the practical 
reality. 
A. Abortion 
The most frequent invocation of artificial gestation in legal 
analysis is the hypothesis that artificial womb technology will 
eliminate the need for abortion and/or the need for the right to 
abortion.
100
 This claim begins as a thought experiment: What would 
the law of abortion be if there were artificial wombs?
101
 The point of 
such a thought experiment is to deepen analysis by separating issues 
that are entwined in real life; the question seeks to disentangle the 
right to end a pregnancy from the right to end the life of the fetus. The 
thought experiment, however, eliminates context: it posits the 
appearance of artificial wombs without considering the experimental 
path that would be necessary for them to be built. Moreover, the 
thought experiment is often presented as not merely a thought 
experiment but as an imminent reality to be prepared for.
102
 The 
promise of imminence gives the scenario extra power and suggests 
that it offers essential truth: Because we will soon have artificial 
wombs, we should analyze rights and relationships today with 
artificial wombs as part of our understanding of reality. This line of 
speculation reveals as much about current ideology as about the 
                                                                                                                 
100 See, e.g., SINGER & WELLS, supra note 23, at 119–20 (arguing that opponents of 
abortion “ought to welcome the development of ectogenesis”). 
101 See, e.g., LAURENCE H. TRIBE, ABORTION: THE CLASH OF ABSOLUTES 220 (1992) 
(contending that the development of artificial wombs or placentas would drastically alter the 
clash over abortion). 
102 See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 161 (1973) (describing artificial wombs as a new 
medical technique); COLEMAN, supra note 7, at 13–14 (stating that a breakthrough in 
ectogenesis could “come at any time”); Gelfand, supra note 7, at 1 (discussing the possibility 
that an artificial womb designed for human use will be developed in the near future); SINGER & 
WELLS, supra note 23, at 117–18 (stating that ectogenesis is “already a partial reality,” and 
predicting that the need for a natural womb may be eliminated completely).  
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problems of the future. In particular, belief in the near-term invention 
of artificial gestation reflects an ideologically tinged tendency to 
devalue pregnancy. That belief, in its turn, reinforces the ideology. 
1. The Preformationist Rhetoric of Abortion 
Just as modern, gene-oriented views of reproduction derive from 
preformation doctrine, modern regulation of abortion derives from a 
preformationist understanding of the embryo as an essentially 
complete new being.
103
 Opponents of abortion today continue to 
assert that life begins at conception as a matter of scientific fact. They 
insist that the combination of chromosomes created at conception is 
the essence of an individual human being, who needs only the 
opportunity to unfold over the course of nine months’ gestation.104 
Reva Siegel’s foundational work on abortion restrictions in the 
United States highlights the preformationist views on which the 
nineteenth-century anti-abortion movement was based. “Doctors 
premised their campaign on a scientific understanding of human 
development as continuous from the point of conception, a scheme in 
which ‘quickening’ had no special significance.”105 They analogized 
the fetus to a baby kangaroo or breast-feeding baby, arguing that the 
fetus was autonomous and not even actually attached to the woman.
106
 
The embryo was described as “self-sustaining” and “self-developing”: 
“[W]hatever it may become . . . is, by growth and development of the 
original, and not by addition of new materials, or attributes . . . .”107 
This is a classic statement of preformation doctrine, made shortly 
before the advent of genetic determinism. As Siegel summarized, 
nineteenth-century doctors “defended the claim that life begins at 
conception with an argument that life developed by autogenesis.”108 
Their theory of reproduction “systematically discounted women’s role 
in reproducing life.”109 
Opponents of abortion continue to rely on the genetic-determinist 
version of preformation as the basis for their argument that 
                                                                                                                 
103 See Siegel, supra note 38, at 288–90 (discussing the historical and modern use of the 
idea that an embryo has a separate and independent existence in arguments for the regulation of 
abortion.). Use of the genetic-determinist version of preformation by modern opponents of 
abortion is discussed infra, text accompanying notes 110–114. 
104 See infra, text accompanying notes 110–114 (discussing abortion opponents’ support 
for this theory). 
105 Siegel, supra note 38, at 282. 
106 Id. at 289 (describing the “kangaroo analogy” used by members of the anti-abortion 
movement). 
107 Id. at 288 (quoting J. Boring, Foeticide, 2 Atlanta Med. & Surgical J. 257, 259 (1857)). 
108 Id. at 289. 
109 Id. at 291. 
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personhood begins at conception. For example, Robert John Araujo’s 
argument against the right to abortion repeatedly invokes science as 
“inexorably” refuting Roe’s use of the term “potential life” to refer to 
a developing embryo or fetus.
110
 Similarly, Charles Lugosi begins his 
discussion of the question when life begins by asserting, “Science 
informs us as to the answer.”111 What science tells us, he says, is that 
a fertilized egg is a “unique individual” which “will develop 
according to its own genetic blueprint . . . .”112 A zygote is “internally 
activated”—i.e., the genetic blueprint itself, rather than the gestational 
process, triggers development—and the genome itself “assumes 
control of the whole morphogenetic process from the beginning of 
embryonic development.”113 These claims are radically 
preformationist. According to Lugosi, the zygote proceeds to 
“execute a plan” that is best carried out “[u]ndisturbed by external 
intervention . . . .”114 Ignored in this account is the zygote’s need for 
several interventions: a uterine wall in which to implant; a protective 
bath of amniotic fluid; a constant supply of nutrients, oxygen, and 
waste elimination facilities; and a complex array of hormones and 
growth factors, all of which are provided by the body of the gestating 
woman. The embryo is seen as directing its own course of 
development, in isolation from the other factors that influence it. This 
insistence that the moral status of the embryo can be determined as a 
matter of scientific fact depends on a genetic determinist and genetic 
essentialist view of reproduction and individual identity. 
The ideological descendants of preformation doctrine thus 
continue to influence the abortion debate today. Moreover, the 
preformationist framing of the debate sets the terms of discussion 
even for those who accept Roe’s terminology of “potential life.” The 
prevailing legal analysis of artificial wombs, including among those 
who support the right to abortion today, is that they will eliminate 
both the need and the justification for abortion rights.
115
 Picking up on 
                                                                                                                 
110 Robert John Araujo, Abortion—From Privacy to Equality: The Failure of the 
Justifications for Taking Human Life, 45 HOUS. L. REV. 1737, 1763–66, 1785 (2009). 
111 Charles I. Lugosi, Conforming to the Rule of Law: When Person and Human Being 
Finally Mean the Same Thing in Fourteenth Amendment Jurisprudence, 22 ISSUES L. & MED. 
119, 123 (2006). 
112 Id.  
113 Id. 
114 Id. at 124. 
115 See, e.g., Goldstein, supra note 13, at 882 (arguing that states could insist that the 
termination of pregnancy be performed using artificial womb techniques); Christopher Kaczor, 
Could Artificial Wombs End the Abortion Debate?, 5 NAT’L CATH. BIOETHICS Q. 283, 284–85 
(2005) (determining that both opponents and defenders of abortion could accept the 
permissibility of using artificial wombs in place of abortion). 
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the arguments of Judith Jarvitz Thomson,
116
 Laurence Tribe,
117
 and 
others that the right to terminate a pregnancy does not necessarily 
include the right to ensure the destruction of the embryo, 
commentators have suggested that artificial wombs could free women 
from unwanted pregnancies while allowing their embryos to 
survive,
118
 effectively “unbundling” the right to abortion.119 A woman 
would still have the right to end her pregnancy but would have no 
right to insist on the death of the embryo.
120
 This discourse reflects 
and reinforces the preformationist theory of the embryo by positing 
that, throughout the entire course of pregnancy, abortion represents a 
fundamental conflict of interest between two individuals. 
This conflict model of pregnancy contributes to a paradox of 
abortion jurisprudence that would be brought into sharper relief by 
the advent of artificial womb technology.
121
 Under current abortion 
                                                                                                                 
116 Judith Jarvitz Thomson, A Defense of Abortion, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 47, 66 (1971) 
(“[W]hile I am arguig for the permissibility of abortion in some cases, I am not arguing for the 
right to secure the death of the unborn child.”). 
117 See TRIBE, supra note 101, at 222: 
Either the development of an artificial womb or the perfection of embryo transfer 
technology beyond the first few days of pregnancy would in practical reality separate 
the two analytically distinct questions raised by the debate about abortion that have 
heretofore remained practically inseparable—the question of the imposition on a 
woman’s liberty, and the question of a fetus for which one is responsible. 
118 See, e.g., Randall & Randall, supra note 29, at 292–93 (quoting Laurence H. Tribe, The 
Supreme Court 1972 Term: Foreword: Toward a Model of Roles in the Due Process of Life and 
Law, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1, 27 (1973) (alteration in the original)): 
Once the fetus can be severed from the [womb] by a process which enables it to 
survive, leaving the abortion decision to private choice would confer not only a right 
to remove an unwanted fetus from one’s body, but also an entirely separate right to 
ensure its death. 
119 See I. Glenn Cohen, The Constitution and the Rights Not to Procreate, 60 STAN. L. 
REV. 1135, 1139 (2008) (“unbundling” the rights to avoid genetic, gestational, and legal 
parenthood). 
120 She may be required to allow removal in a way that maximizes the chance of fetal 
survival, even if the necessary procedure is somewhat riskier to herself. See Gonzales v. 
Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 168 (2007) (upholding the federal Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act despite 
its lack of health exception); COLEMAN, supra note 7, at 81–83 (discussing the possibility that, 
although the transfer might be substantially more invasive than abortion, that it might 
nonetheless be required by law or by hospital policy); Jennifer S. Hendricks, Body and Soul: 
Equality, Pregnancy, and the Unitary Right to Abortion, 45 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 329, 348 
(2010) (arguing that Gonzales v. Carhart can be used to justify a high standard of medical risk). 
121 For more extensive discussion of the paradox of viability doctrine, see, e.g., Bruce 
Ching, Inverting the Viability Test for Abortion Law, 22 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 37, 38 (2000) 
(arguing that “[i]f the reasoning of Roe and Casey is taken at face value, then courts should 
strike down any regulation of post-viability abortion that does not include an exception for those 
procedures which offer fetuses a meaningful chance for survival and continued life”); Hyun Jee 
Son, Comment, Artificial Wombs, Frozen Embryos, and Abortion: Reconciling Viability’s 
Doctrinal Ambiguity, 14 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 213, 217–26 (2005) (outlining problems with the 
viability doctrine). 
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law, the fact that a fetus is viable justifies requiring the woman to 
continue the pregnancy. The right to elective abortion ends when the 
fetus reaches viability.
122
 Moreover, viability is defined by the current 
state of medical technology.
123
 That is, the existence of technology 
that would permit the fetus to survive outside the womb justifies 
requiring the pregnant woman to continue to sustain the fetus inside 
the womb. Nothing in the viability rule is tied to the affordability of 
the technology that would be required to sustain the fetus.
124
 Viability 
is treated as if it were a quality inherent in the fetus rather than a 
function of society’s ability and willingness to provide the necessary 
technology. Neonatal technology therefore performs two functions: 
first, its intended function, of saving babies in emergency deliveries; 
and second, its legal function of marking the viability line beyond 
which woman may be forced to remain pregnant in the absence of 
medical emergency. The existence of the technology eliminates the 
possibility of its being used, except in those emergencies. 
The availability of artificial wombs would make the abortion 
question harder, not easier.
125
 Why does the right to abortion currently 
end at viability?
126
 That appears to be the point at which we deem the 
pregnant woman a mother and believe that she has a duty to continue 
                                                                                                                 
122 See Ching, supra note 121, at 38 (examining Roe’s holding that the state’s interest 
becomes compelling at the point of viability). 
123 See id. at 41 (“[C]ontinuing medical and technological advances in fetal care will have 
the legal impact of allowing states to prohibit abortion . . . at earlier and earlier stages of 
pregnancy.”). See also Planned Parenthood Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 
860 (1992) (stating that the soundness of the viability doctrine “in no sense turns on whether 
viability occurs at approximately 28 weeks, as was usual at the time of Roe, at 23 to 24 weeks, 
as it sometimes does today, or at some moment even slightly earlier in pregnancy, as it may if 
fetal respiratory capacity can somehow be enhanced in the future”); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 
163 (1973) (reasoning that the justification for drawing the line at viability is that “the fetus then 
presumably has the capacity of meaningful life outside the mother’s womb”). 
124 Commentators discussing forced ectogenesis as an alternative to abortion often assume 
that the state would be obligated to bear the costs. See, e.g., Goldstein, supra note 13, at 916–21 
(arguing that the state would have to pay at least when the woman could not afford to do so). 
Commentators differ in their assumptions regarding whether the resulting child would be 
presumptively a ward of the state or be deemed the child of the formerly pregnant woman. 
Compare Goldstein, supra note 13, at 901 (arguing that the child would be the state’s 
responsibility), with Jackson, supra note 37, at 362 (arguing that the child would be the 
woman’s responsibility). 
125 For others reaching the conclusion that artificial gestation would complicate rather than 
resolve the abortion controversy, see, for example, Gelfand, supra note 37, at 104 ([T]he advent 
of ectogenetic technology . . . will require those who propose severance theories to determine 
the moral status of a fetus, an undertaking they hoped to avoid.”); Son, supra note 121, at 221–
222 (arguing that the use of artificial gestation demonstrates the ambiguity in the Casey 
standard). 
126 Several commentators have discussed the tension between the viability doctrine and 
reproductive technology, as well as the general lack of a strong theoretical basis for using 
viability to define the scope of the right to abortion. See, e.g., Son, supra note 121, at 217–18 
(providing an overview of the implications of ectogenesis for the viability doctrine.). But see 
TRIBE, supra note 101, at 207 (mildly defending the viability rule). 
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to gestate. Alternatively, the current point of viability serves as a 
marker for when we roughly believe the fetus to have human status. 
In addition, viability currently occurs at approximately the same time 
that carrying to term becomes medically safer than abortion for the 
pregnant woman.
127
 
For a Supreme Court that has never provided a convincing 
rationale for relying on viability, this coincidence provides convenient 
cover.
128
 The advent of artificial womb technology would force us to 
confront questions about viability and abortion more thoroughly than 
we have so far. 
2. Path Dependence and the Moral Status of Embryos 
Although we do not have artificial wombs today, current 
technology also raises questions about the moral status of embryos—
or at least pre-embryos—and the answers that have emerged are 
revealing in their implications for artificial gestation. Based on 
current practices, we appear already to have decided that the 
technological capacity to turn a fertilized egg into a baby does not 
imply a moral duty to do so. The process of designing and building 
artificial wombs would reinforce rather than undermine that 
consensus. 
Proposals to substitute forced ectogenesis for abortion ignore what 
appears to be an increasingly strong social consensus about the status 
of embryos and pre-embryos in laboratories. Pre-embryos are 
routinely destroyed or frozen indefinitely in the course of in vitro 
fertilization procedures. It is unlikely that the state could seize them 
and distribute them to infertile couples in order for those couples to 
have babies.
129
 Yet, we entertain the possibility that the state would 
                                                                                                                 
127 See Nancy K. Rhoden, Trimesters and Technology: Revamping Roe v. Wade, 95 YALE 
L.J. 639, 639–40 n.9 (1986) (calculating that abortion is safer than childbirth until at least the 
twenty-first week); COUNCIL ON SCIENTIFIC AFFAIRS, AMERICAN MEDICAL ASS’N, Induced 
Termination of Pregnancy Before and After Roe v Wade: Trends in the Mortality and Morbidity 
of Women, 268 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 3231, 3232 (1992) (discussing mortality data from legal 
abortions). The most recently published study of the relative safety of abortion and childbirth 
found that abortion was about fourteen times safer than childbirth but did not differentiate 
according to gestational age at either abortion or birth. Elizabeth G. Raymond & David A. 
Grimes, The Comapartive Safety of Legal Induced Abortion and Childbirth in the United States, 
199 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 215 (2012). 
128 See Hendricks, supra note 120, at 345 (“The right to elective abortion has thus 
suspended much of the pre-Roe debate over the medical conditions justifying therapeutic 
abortion.”). 
129 At most, courts have been troubled about whether one of the genetic contributors ought 
to have the unilateral right to use or destroy the embryos. See, e.g., Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 
588, 589 (Tenn. 1992) (addressing the question of who would have custody of seven frozen 
embryos stored in a fertility clinic after a couple filed for divorce). See generally Bridget M. 
Fuselier, The Trouble With Putting All of Your Eggs in One Basket: Using a Property Rights 
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forcibly seize aborted embryos, grow them in artificial wombs, and 
either give the resulting children to their progenitors or place them in 
orphanages to await adoption. The only important difference between 
today’s frozen pre-embryo and the future’s candidate for artificial 
gestation is that one started in a laboratory and one started in a 
woman. If that distinction confers personhood or the right to be 
nurtured into a baby, then the ectogenic solution to abortion is merely 
another manifestation of the ideology that motherhood is obligatory. 
Moreover, a world with artificial wombs would be a different 
world than the world in which we live today. It would be a world with 
a history of the decisions, practices, and experiments that would be 
necessary to produce artificial wombs. That history, which we can 
ignore when we merely contemplate the fantasy of artificial gestation, 
would alter the cultural landscape around reproduction. Proponents of 
building artificial wombs are necessarily advocating extensive 
experimentation on embryos and fetuses at increasingly advanced 
stages of development. If the public interest in medical science 
justifies this experimentation, which would likely involve the 
destruction of many embryos created for precisely that purpose, it is 
unclear why the state interest in embryonic life should trump a 
woman’s interest in controlling her reproductive process. A 
government that had condoned the experiments necessary to create 
reliable artificial wombs would be hard-pressed to justify using that 
technology to compel motherhood. 
3. Alternatives to the Maternal-Fetal Conflict Model 
Finally, proposals to substitute ectogenesis for abortion implicitly 
assume that the rate of pregnancy terminations would remain 
constant. This assumption reveals an important misunderstanding of 
the role abortion plays in women’s lives. Women who consider 
abortion a moral option do so because their understanding of 
pregnancy, and thus of abortion, rejects the genetic preformationism 
that leads others to see the embryo as a distinct individual from the 
time of conception. 
Again, consider the situation in terms of today’s technology. 
Although we do not have any devices that we call “artificial wombs,” 
we can rescue an infant delivered long before full term. After 
viability, the state may prohibit abortion. Yet, we do not see women 
who are barred from having post-viability abortions asking instead for 
                                                                                                                 
 
Model to Resolve Disputes Over Cryopreserved Pre-Embryos, 14 TEX. J. C.L. & C.R. 143, 148–
56 (2009) (describing the approaches that have been taken in disputes over frozen embryos). 
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early induction of labor. Once abortion is ruled out, the factors 
affecting the woman’s decisions about the pregnancy change: there is 
now a future child to consider. Most women would prefer to endure 
an unwanted but normal pregnancy rather than subject a child to the 
risks of prematurity. 
What little research exists on attitudes toward artificial wombs 
suggests that they would elicit the same lack of enthusiasm as 
premature induction of labor: few women would consider artificial 
gestation an appropriate response to an unwanted pregnancy.
130
 In the 
only empirical study of this question, women who were opposed to 
abortion rights stated that transferring a fetus to an artificial womb 
would be an immoral abandonment of maternal duty, even if it 
protected the life of the fetus.
131
 At the same time, women who 
supported abortion rights rejected artificial wombs for the same 
reasons that so many women choose abortion over adoption: they 
believed there is a relevant moral difference between a fetus and a 
baby and said they would be reluctant to give up a baby even if the 
pregnancy had been unwanted.
132
 Both groups of women saw 
themselves as responsible for making a moral choice regarding the 
potential child, and artificial gestation was inconsistent with how they 
perceived their obligation.
133
 In practical terms, this suggests that to 
compel artificial gestation would be to compel motherhood (or illegal 
abortion) in our ectogenic future as surely as a ban on abortion does 
so today. Moreover, as with adoption, mandating ectogenesis would 
                                                                                                                 
130 The only empirical effort to gauge women’s responses to the prospect of ectogenesis as 
an alternative to abortion is Leslie Cannold’s study of a small sample of Australian women. 
Leslie Cannold, Women, Ectogenesis, and Ethical Theory, in ECTOGENESIS, supra note 7, at 50 
(describing the results of a survey of forty-five Australian women). 
131 Id. at 55 (“For women opposed to abortion rights, good women make motherhood their 
top priority.”). 
132 Id. at 52 (“Over and over again women ground their rejection of adoption and 
ectogenesis in a belief that it would be morally irresponsible of them to bring a child into the 
world they were unwilling or unable to parent.”); cf. ROTHMAN, supra note 16, at 107 (“If 
women took motherhood casually, abortion would be much less important.”). 
133 Compare this reaction to the dilemma of ectogenesis to common assumptions about 
women seeking abortions, as reflected in comments such as: “Under state-mandated womb-
emptying, the state would bear the responsibility of dealing with the resultant children, isolating 
the mother from the red-tape of adoption.” Goldstein, supra note 13, at 901 (footnote omitted). 
The implication that women prefer abortion to adoption because of the “red-tape” reflects a 
common belief that women have abortions for relatively trivial and selfish reasons. See also Doe 
v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 221 (1973) (White, J., dissenting) (“At the heart of the controversy [in 
Roe v. Wade and Doe v. Bolton] are those recurring pregnancies that pose no danger whatsoever 
to the life or health of the mother. . . . [The majority interprets the U.S. Constitution as] 
valu[ing] the convenience, whim, or caprice of the putative mother more than the life or 
potential life of the fetus . . . .”). 
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put the greatest pressure on women of color, whose children fare the 
worst in the adoption and foster care system.
134
 
The notion that the state could mandate artificial gestation is 
premised on the general notion that the state can act against the 
pregnant woman on behalf of the embryo or fetus.
135
 This premise is 
different from the state acting on behalf of a future child, such as by 
supporting maternal health for the sake of the future child. Rather, the 
very question is whether the embryo is to become a child. The 
premise is thus that a woman seeking an abortion has an inherent 
conflict of interest with the embryo, a premise that is based on the 
preformationist ideology of reproduction. Rejecting that ideology and 
the dichotomy between the woman’s body and the developing embryo 
also implies rejecting the suggestion that state-mandated ectogenesis 
could be a moral solution to unwanted pregnancy. 
The concept of “maternal-fetal conflict” appears frequently in 
discussions of pregnancy and reproduction.
136
 Such a conflict is in 
one sense inherent in every pregnancy. From the perspective of genes 
(rather than people), the fetus’s genes “want” to use as much of the 
mother’s physiological resources as they can, while the mother’s 
genes “want” to invest appropriately in this potential offspring but 
also to preserve resources for existing and possible future children.
137
 
The same conflict of interest exists, however, with respect to any 
particular ovum or sperm, each of which contains genes that “want” 
to be reproductively successful. A person who uses birth control or 
seeks an abortion is making a decision not to create a child at a 
particular time in order to conserve resources (in a very broad sense 
of the word) for herself and for her family, including existing and 
future children.
138
 
A conflict of interest, in this sense, between a woman and the 
genes of the ova, sperm, zygote, or embryo contained in her body is 
not necessarily a conflict of interest between the woman and the 
                                                                                                                 
134 See Randall & Randall, supra note 29, at 308 (arguing that mandatory ectogenesis 
would disproportionately affect women whose babies are less likely to be adopted). 
135 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 150 (1973) (identifying the state interest in the 
potential life of the fetus). 
136 See Michelle Oberman, Mothers and Doctors’ Orders: Unmasking the Doctor’s 
Fiduciary Role in Maternal-Fetal Conflicts, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 451, 451–52 (2000) 
(summarizing circumstances in which maternal-fetal conflicts are identified). 
137 See RICHARD DAWKINS, THE SELFISH GENE 129 (30th anniversary ed. 2006) 
(discussing the maternal-child conflict with respect to when to wean the child). At some point, 
the fetus’s genes actually prefer to allow the mother to care for siblings, but that point comes 
beyond the point where the mother’s genes would prefer her to do so. Id. at 128. 
138 Cf. Cannold, supra note 130, at 54 (describing one of her study participant’s expression 
of the view that abortion is a moral decision based on “an evaluation that continuing the 
pregnancy would harm her maternal/fetal-child unit”). 
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inchoate child of which any of those genes might become a part. That 
would be so only under the genetic determinist view that vests 
individual identity in the embryo. To posit state-mandated artificial 
gestation as a legitimate alternative to abortion is to overlook the 
moral claim of a woman having an abortion to make a decision not to 
reproduce, taking into account her family interests as well as her own. 
It is a decision “that continuing the pregnancy would harm her 
maternal/fetal-child unit.”139 
For many women, an abortion is not a refusal to care for a child; it 
is a decision not to create a child.
140
 Imagining a machine that could 
create the child in a woman’s stead, however, helps construct abortion 
as a refusal to provide sustenance to a life in being. The construction 
implies that refusal may be justified or within the woman’s rights, but 
it is nonetheless unfortunate that another individual life must pay the 
price for her refusal. This implicit presumption of a conflict of 
interest between the woman and the embryo is based on preformation 
doctrine. But calling the initial genetic contribution “nature” and 
everything else “nurture” is a cultural choice. If at some point in 
pregnancy it makes sense to think of the fetus as a separate being, 
science cannot tell us when that moment occurs.
141
 For the same 
reason, technology will not resolve the controversy over abortion. 
B. Commercial Surrogacy 
While legal scholars have been interested in artificial wombs 
primarily as a state-mandated alternative to abortion, others have 
focused on the voluntary use of ectogenesis as an alternative to 
human surrogacy. In this context, the prospect of artificial gestation 
heightens concerns about commodification of children but reaffirms 
the appropriateness of commodifying gestation. The hypothesis that 
machines can perform gestation provides reassurance that gestation is 
not a core or essential part of mothering.
142
 Pregnancy can be seen as 
“a mere biological function . . . and not also as a human bond in 
                                                                                                                 
139 Id. 
140 See ROTHMAN, supra note 16, at 123 (challenging the distinction between 
“contraception, not letting this month’s egg grow, and abortion, not letting this month’s 
fertilized egg grow”). 
141 Cf. R. Alta Charo, The Hunting of the Snark: The Moral Status of Embryos, Right-to-
Lifers, and Third World Women, 6 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 11, 11 (1995) (criticizing the work 
of the National Institutes of Health’s Human Embryo Research Panel to determine the moral 
status of human embryos through the lens of scientific deduction). 
142 See Richard F. Storrow, Parenthood by Pure Intention: Assisted Reproduction and the 
Functional Approach to Parentage, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 597, 619 (2002) (“This view of the 
primacy of genetics is only fed by attempts to render natural gestation fungible through the 
development of alternative means of gestation, namely artificial wombs, or to minimize its 
importance by pointing to the capacity of incubators to perform it in part.”) (footnote omitted). 
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formation of new life that can be had in no other way.”143 Using 
Dorothy Roberts’s terms, gestation becomes one of the “menial” tasks 
of mothering rather than one of the “spiritual” components that make 
motherhood a desirable state.
144
 
1. Cost and the Globalization of Surrogacy 
The existence of commercial surrogacy alongside ectogenesis 
would invite comparisons regarding both cost and quality. It is hard to 
predict which would be more expensive. Would a human surrogate be 
regarded as the preferred, “handcrafted” alternative to mass 
production, or as an undesirable risk who might damage the fetus? 
In the United States, the surrogacy industry has tried to cultivate a 
norm of capping payments to surrogate mothers. These price caps 
help to avoid the stigma of baby-selling and are claimed to ensure that 
the surrogate will be a “good mother” who will not negligently or 
recklessly endanger the health of the fetus. A low price ensures that 
her motives are at least partially altruistic.
145
 Discussions of artificial 
wombs often refer to a possible cost disparity between human and 
mechanical surrogacy; however, no one has argued that caps should 
be imposed to keep the price of ectogenesis artificially low, in order 
to ensure that the providers of that service act with the child’s best 
interests at heart. 
The structure of the surrogacy industry, however, is in flux. The 
market for surrogacy is now global,
146
 which has several implications 
for its operation. Social similarity, including racial similarity, between 
the buyers and sellers of reproductive services is reduced, and 
economic disparities are more pronounced.
147
 To insist that the 
                                                                                                                 
143 Murphy, supra note 21, at 79. 
144 See Roberts, supra note 25, at 65–68: 
While the ‘surrogate’ provides the menial labor of gestating the fetus to term, the 
contracting wife is designated as the baby’s spiritual mother . . . . As the case of 
‘gestational surrogacy’ illustrates, the background of racial inequality adds another, 
related set of concerns about contract pregnancy. ‘Surrogacy’ perpetuates the racial 
hierarchy within the division of reproductive labor, as well as the racist valuation of 
genetic material. 
145 See Kimberly D. Krawiec, Altruism and Intermediation in the Market for Babies, 66 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 203, 244–47 (2009) (discussing the market forces behind surrogacy and 
price caps on surrogacy). 
146 See Ultimate Outsourcing: Wombs for Rent in India (NBC television broadcast Feb. 20, 
2008), available at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/23252624/print/displaymode/1098 
(discussing how surrogates in India provide a cheaper alternative for infertile couples). 
147 See Lisa C. Ikemoto. Reproductive Tourism: Equality Concerns in the Global Market 
for Fertility Services, 27 LAW & INEQ. 277, 308 (2009) (noting that racial differences may make 
international surrogacy more attractive since it weakens the perceived relationship between the 
surrogate and the child); cf. Leslie Bender, Genes, Parents, and Assisted Reproductive 
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surrogate’s primary motivation is altruistic therefore becomes more 
difficult. In this new global manifestation of commercial surrogacy, 
costs are kept down not by formal price caps but by the poverty of the 
pool of potential surrogates. This change, in turn, presents the 
intended parents with a dilemma regarding quality control. With the 
commercial aspects of the transaction more salient, and the surrogate 
mother more definitively “other,” contracting couples are more likely 
to worry about how well she will care for their embryo. As one might 
expect, transnational surrogacy increasingly involves daily 
supervision and control of the surrogate mothers to ensure the health 
of the babies they deliver.
148
 
Artificial gestation is thus consistent with trends in the surrogacy 
industry towards increasingly explicit commodification of pregnancy 
and control of gestational mothers. Ectogenesis appears to offer an 
escape from some of the problematic aspects of human surrogacy. At 
the same time, the promise of gestation by machine reinforces the 
idea that gestation is an essentially fungible service, rather than a 
form of parenthood. 
2. The Preformationist Rhetoric of Surrogacy 
The actual or potential availability of artificial wombs resonates 
with the ideology that supports commercial surrogacy. In the world of 
surrogacy, for example, “the woman gives the baby ‘back to the 
father,’ as if it came from him in the first place” in the classic 
preformationist sense.
149
 The technological alternative also 
rationalizes thinking of the surrogate as a container, which in turn 
justifies controlling how she mothers the child she is creating.
150
 
Artificial wombs can encourage this perspective even before they 
exist, as long as we believe in their possibility and desirability. When 
we predict a future in which gestation is mechanical and controlled, 
                                                                                                                 
 
Technologies: ARTs, Mistakes, Sex, Race, and Law, 12 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 1, 54–76 
(2003) (discussing the role that race has played in custody battles involving surrogacy contracts 
and clinic mistakes). 
148 See ROTHMAN, supra note 16, at 204 (describing the common lack of trust for 
caregivers); Krawiec, supra note 145, at 225 & n.109 (noting that “the ability to supervise and 
control the behavior of the surrogate” is one of the reasons for outsourcing, since in India, 
“surrogates typically live together at the clinic or in a supervised home”). Here, too, the global 
division of reproductive labor echoes the division between a husband and wife, or a wife and a 
nanny. 
149 ROTHMAN, supra note 16, at 80 (emphasis in the original). 
150 See Murphy, supra note 21, at 79 (arguing that artificial gestation could “contribute to 
excessive concern for ‘quality control’ in fetal development”). 
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we facilitate classifying gestation as one of the “menial” parts of 
mothering, and thus as a legitimate subject of a commercial contract.  
The legal system enables this process of increasing 
commodification by drawing a sharp distinction between “traditional 
surrogacy” and “gestational surrogacy.” Traditional surrogacy relies 
on artificial insemination of the gestational mother, who is also the 
genetic mother. In the most famous case of traditional surrogacy, In 
re Baby M,
151
 the Supreme Court of New Jersey declared the 
surrogacy contract void as contrary to public policy and recognized 
the “surrogate,” Mary Beth Whitehead, as the legal mother of Baby 
M.
152
 Gestational surrogacy, on the other hand, uses in vitro 
fertilization to ensure that the gestational mother has no genetic claim 
to the child. Gestational surrogacy is what makes global surrogacy 
possible and attractive, especially across racial lines.
153
 Sometimes 
the egg comes from the intended mother but it may also be purchased. 
Certainly, some intended parents might prefer to select an egg 
separately from selecting a gestational mother. As the law is 
developing, however, they are effectively required to do so in order to 
be recognized as legal parents and, especially, to be assured of 
defeating any claim attempted by the gestational mother. 
Because of the variety of ways that people use reproductive 
technology, the emphasis on genetics in the law of surrogacy cannot 
be explained merely by judicial willingness to enforce the parties’ 
contractual intent. The parties in Baby M had the same contractual 
intent as in any other case, and the reason the contract was not 
enforced was because of Whitehead’s genetic connection to the child. 
In contrast, the parties in Perry-Rogers v. Fasano
154
 had no 
contractual intent: Donna Fasano was undergoing in vitro fertilization 
and was mistakenly given one of the Perry-Rogers’s embryos along 
with her own.
155
 She gave birth to twin boys who were genetically 
unrelated to each other. In the ensuing custody battle, genes won. 
                                                                                                                 
151 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988). 
152 Id. at 1234. In an opinion infamous for its condescension, classism, and sexism, the 
courts held that Whitehead was the baby’s legal mother, awarded custody to the genetic father, 
and granted Whitehead visitation. Id. at 1253, 1261, 1263; see ROTHMAN, supra note 16, at 45–
47 (criticizing the Baby M. court). 
153 This is not meant to suggest that culturally relevant racial categories have a natural or 
genetic basis. It is an observation that white American parents would not be having as many 
children through Indian surrogates if the children had to be created using the gestational 
mothers’ eggs. See Ikemoto, supra note 147, at 308 (noting the role that race plays in making 
international surrogacy attractive). Anxiety about maintaining racial categories probably plays a 
role in courts’ willingness to decide cases of disputed parentage on the basis of genetics. In the 
cases discussed infra, text accompanying notes 153–54, the Fasano family was white, and the 
Perry-Rogers family was African American. See Bender, supra, note 1477, at 1–3. 
154 715 N.Y.S.2d 19 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000). 
155 Id. at 21. 
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The fantasy of an artificial womb depends on and maintains a 
patriarchal definition of parenthood and the reification of DNA as the 
essence of identity. The womb is seen as merely the maternal 
environment, separate from the fetus in the way we think of ourselves 
as separate from our environment. Genes, on the other hand, are 
imagined as cerebral rather than physical. They are a “blueprint,” not 
merely physical substances that take part in chemical reactions. In this 
cultural climate, the fantasy of the artificial womb helps us deny that 
gestation also shapes who we are, which is crucial to denying the 
parental status of a surrogate mother. 
3. Responses to Epigenetics 
While the cultural primacy of genes has facilitated the 
commodification of gestation through surrogacy contracts, 
discoveries in epigenetics have met with predictable responses in the 
reproductive technology industry. That is, the role of gestation in 
development has been either accepted or rejected depending on pre-
existing ideology. 
On the one hand, some businesses offering in vitro fertilization 
with purchased ova have seized on epigenetic discoveries to show 
their clients that they are the “real” mothers of the children they bear, 
despite the prevailing cultural fixation on DNA. For example, the 
“Recipient Information Sheet” for one egg broker includes a section 
titled “Women who give birth to donor egg babies are the biological 
moms.”156 This section first discusses the importance of the 
gestational mother in providing the physical materials for 
constructing the child, invoking an analogy between the genes as 
blueprint and the gestational mother as builder.
157
 It then goes on to 
explain epigenetics and the regulation of gene expression. This 
section concludes with the following passage, reassuring the 
gestational mother about her role: 
A donor egg baby gets her genes from the donor; she gets the 
‘instructions’ on the expression of those genes from the 
woman who carries her to term. . . . 
The child who is born would have been a physically [and] no 
doubt emotionally different person if carried by his genetic 
mother. . . . 
                                                                                                                 
156 NURTURE EGG DONOR PROGRAM, www.nurture.co.za/the-tricky-subject-of-disclosure 
(last visited Feb. 12, 2012). 
157 Id. (“[I]f you think of your dream child as your dream house, the genes provide merely 
a basic blueprint . . . .”). 
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The implication of epigenetics is that the child inherits 
characteristics from the woman who carries the child even if 
the original DNA comes from a donor egg. In other words the 
birth mother influences what the child is like at a genetic 
level—it IS her child.158 
On the other hand, women participating as both gestational 
mothers and intended mothers in surrogacy contracts may reject this 
possibility. Responding to the passages quoted above, some 
participants on a surrogacy discussion board acknowledged “a fair bit 
of science” behind the claims, but others rejected them and the 
underlying science as flatly unacceptable.
159
 Interestingly, some 
participants appeared to feel it was necessary to reject the scientific 
claim about genetic influence in order to reject the social 
conclusion—“it IS her child.”160 On both sides, then, genes were seen 
as preeminent, so that genetic influence defined whose the child “IS.” 
This insistence on a biological answer to the question of ascribing 
parenthood is especially revealing in light of the fact that all the 
people in this discussion were involved in creating children through 
recently invented technologies that disrupt the biological mechanisms 
for reproduction in some fashion. 
4. Artificial Gestation and the Ethic of Care 
These responses to new scientific information are typical in that 
they seek to assimilate the new information into a pre-existing theory 
of reproduction; the tendency of a worldview to reinforce itself is one 
of the reasons that Firestone saw the potential for liberating uses of 
ectogenesis but did not expect the technology itself to produce 
liberation.
161
 Because of this tendency, the greatest opposition to 
ectogenesis among feminists comes from those who place a high 
                                                                                                                 
158 Id. 
159 Epigenetics—Importance of Birth Mother, ALL ABOUT SURROGACY, 
www.allaboutsurrogacy.com/forums/index.php?showtopic=42386 (last updated Aug. 4, 2008). 
One commenter asserted that epigenetic effects “can simply vanish” while genetic traits cannot. 
Id. Another acknowledged that environment could influence development but stated, “I do not 
believe for a second that I [sic] being the carrier does anything to change the genetics of the 
baby.” The same commentator drew a distinction between “epigenetics” and “ACTUAL 
genetics.” Id. 
160 Id. 
161 See FIRESTONE, supra note 26, at 8–11 (arguing that “new technology, especially 
fertility control, may be used against [women and children] to reinforce the entrenched system 
of exploitation”). See also John A. Robertson, Embryos, Families, and Procreative Liberty: The 
Legal Structure of the New Reproduction, 59 S. CAL L. REV. 939, 1033 (1986) (“In the final 
analysis, the impact of noncoital technology on women depends on how it is used more than on 
what it is.”); see also Woolfrey, supra note 30, at 129–30, 134–37 (evaluating Firestone’s 
arguments in light of recent developments in ectogenesis). 
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value on cultural feminism’s ethic of care.162 They fear that 
ectogenesis will be theorized and used in ways that further entrench 
an idealized norm of autonomous individuality that devalues 
connection, care, and dependence along with gestation. 
Belongingness in a family can be analogized to belongingness in 
other political communities. In the United States, membership in a 
family and membership in the political community are defined 
through the same act of birth: “All persons born . . . in the United 
States . . . are citizens of the United States, and of the State wherein 
they reside.”163 In other words, if you are born here, then you are part 
of us. While this clause has rarely been construed by the Supreme 
Court, one of the Court’s decisions about immigration law reveals the 
values embodied in the Citizenship Clause.
 
In Nguyen v. INS,
164
 the 
Court held that a child’s connection with her mother, which arises 
from the act of birth, is an important part of the political connection 
that gives rise to the right to citizenship.
165
 
The family is also a political institution, and initial membership 
has, traditionally, been established according to jus soli: a child’s 
family is defined according to the woman from whom she emerges. 
For the state to create a child in an artificial womb would be to create 
the family-level equivalent of a stateless person. Just as the state 
cannot deny citizenship to a child born here, the state should not be 
able to deny family membership to a child by creating her as an 
intentional orphan. The child would be “born without the presence of 
a woman who is most likely to have a physical and psychological 
bond to her.”166 While a stateless person might find a home and an 
artificially gestated child might find a family, this is not a condition to 
be desired or sought. State-initiated or state-mandated ectogenesis 
would thus threaten important values that are protected by family 
structure and parental rights.
167
 
                                                                                                                 
162 See, e.g., ROTHMAN, supra note 16, at 241–42 (arguing against the surrogacy 
relationship because children “enter the world in . . . a physical and social and emotional 
relationship with the woman in whose body they have been nurtured”). 
163 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
164 533 U.S. 53 (2001). 
165 See Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 64–68 (2001) (stating that the connection to the 
mother implies a connection to the United States, which justifies distinguishing between 
mothers and fathers with respect to their ability to transmit citizenship). 
166 Maureen Sander-Staudt, Of Machine Born? A Feminist Assessment of Ectogenesis and 
Artificial Wombs, in ECTOGENESIS, supra note 7, at 109, 124. 
167 State-controlled ectogenesis would also threaten the commitment to pluralism that 
requires deference to individuals on family matters. See Jennifer S. Hendricks, Essentially a 
Mother, 13 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 429, 481 (2007) (discussing how the market is not 
necessarily “committed to maintaining pluralism or ensuring the transmission of a variety of 
cultures”). 
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In contrast, if ectogenesis were used voluntarily for procreation, in 
most cases the resulting child would be welcomed into a waiting 
family. Some parents might even feel more connected to a child 
developing in the machine than to one growing inside a partner or a 
paid gestational mother. Perhaps, for example, the machine would 
have a window; visually oriented people might feel closer because 
they could see the fetus.
168
 Nonetheless, cultural feminist theories 
suggest ways in which the practice of ectogenesis could have harmful 
effects on the prospective parents, the resulting children, or society as 
a whole. 
The practice of ectogenesis may actually encourage the parties 
involved to abandon the fetus. First, further commodification of 
reproduction might foster a consumer mentality among prospective 
parents. This attitude has already appeared in a few surrogacy cases, 
in which prospective parents have tried to insist on abortions or 
simply renege on taking legal custody of the child.
169
 Second, because 
part of the promise of artificial gestation is “better babies,” the 
practice of ectogenesis might tend to lower the threshold at which 
parents decide to abort due to fetal anomalies.  
Finally, with ectogenesis, everyone who participated in the child’s 
conception would have the physical ability to do what a pregnant 
woman cannot: walk away. It is easier to walk away from a 
microscopic embryo than from a newborn baby. Even later in the 
process, when abortion is less likely to be requested and may be 
prohibited, it is easier to walk away if you are a medical tourist in a 
poor country. And even when it is presumably hard to walk away, 
parents sometimes do. On the other hand, people who seek 
parenthood through technology have often exhausted other means and 
dearly wish to have a child. The vast majority of parents who rely on 
gestational surrogates raise the resulting child. While in a few cases 
intended parents have tried to refuse custody, they appear to have 
done so on the assumption that the gestational surrogate would 
                                                                                                                 
168 See Beth A. Burkstrand-Reid, The More Things Change . . . : Abortion Politics and the 
Regulation of Assisted Reproductive Technology, 79 UMKC L. REV. 361, 369 (2011) 
(describing how seeing an embryo or fetus on ultrasound can influence a woman to think of 
herself as a mother, even before an in vitro embryo is implanted). 
169 See, e.g., In re Marriage of Buzzanca, 61 Cal.App.4th 1410, 1412 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998) 
(describing the facts of the case, in which a husband disclaimed responsibility to a child born 
pursuant to a surrogacy agreement after divorcing ); Tom Blackwell, Couple Urged Surrogate 
to Abort Fetus Due to Defect, NAT’L POST (Can.), Oct. 6, 2010, at A1 (reporting that a Canadian 
couple discovered the fetus carried by their surrogate mother likely had Down’s syndrome, and 
that the couple then requested that the surrogate have an abortion).  
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otherwise keep the child.
170
 Such abandonment might thus be less 
likely when it is clear that no other parent is available. 
Some commentators have also expressed concern that a child 
created through artificial gestation would be a “little alien,” a stranger 
to the human family who arrives without the concrete connection of a 
blood and flesh relationship.
171
 This concern is not directed at 
concrete developmental impairments that might result from some 
reproductive technology; rather, the concern is an existential one. 
Does the creation of children in this way represent a fundamental 
rejection of human connectedness, our nature as social beings? This is 
an important question. But it is a leap to suppose that this existential 
question will inherently affect the individual child herself, as opposed 
to affecting the general society’s understanding of the human 
situation. Moreover, given that technology has a way of creating its 
own inevitability, it is unwise to suggest that a group of children—
who may come into existence whether we approve or not—are in 
some way non-human.
172
 
Instead, these concerns should be directed at the larger society and 
how it might be affected if the fantasy of artificial gestation were 
realized. The connectedness and physical experience of pregnancy 
play an important role in cultural feminist theory. The experience of 
pregnancy and related biological functions are said to foster in 
women a greater sense of connection to others and a greater capacity 
for empathy.
173
 If that is true, then frequent use of ectogenesis would 
decrease the quantity of empathy available in society as a whole. 
Overall alienation from the body and from others would increase. 
On the other hand, it seems unlikely that the correlation between 
female embodiedness and relational capacity is created at the 
individual level. Girls and women may exhibit a typically “female” 
sense of connectedness without having experienced any uniquely 
female biological capacity beyond living in a female body.
174
 The 
                                                                                                                 
170 But see Buzzanca, , 61 Cal.App.4th at 1413–1414 (expressing amazement that the 
intended father tried to disclaim the validity of the surrogacy agreement even after he 
encouraged the trial court to accept a stipulation that the surrogate and her husband were not the 
legal parents). 
171 ROTHMAN, supra note 16, at 103. 
172 Consider, for example, the dystopia in KAZUO ISHIGURO, NEVER LET ME GO 260–61 
(2005), in which clones created through ectogenesis and raised in orphanages serve as organ 
donors because society believes them to lack souls. Consider also the medieval recipe for 
artificial gestation, which was said to produce a child without a soul. See supra note 45 
(discussing this medieval belief). 
173 See Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 2–3 (1988) 
(outlining the connection thesis); Sander-Staudt, supra note 166, at 117 (“Care ethicists 
speculate that the physical aspects of women’s reproductive biology can contribute to the 
development of a relational ethical perspective.”). 
174 The foundational psychological work in this area, CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT 
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association between pregnancy and a female capacity for relationship 
appears to operate at a cultural rather than an individual level. In 
recent years, many feminist theorists have moved beyond the 
essentialist version of cultural feminism that associates the ethic of 
care with female bodies. Instead, they emphasize the universality of 
vulnerability, connectedness, and dependence on others, a 
universality that is often masked by the cultural emphasis on 
individual autonomy.
175
 
As liberal feminists would point out, ectogenesis could be valuable 
precisely because it would disrupt the association of women with 
providing care. This disruption, however, would come at the cost of 
rejecting and devaluing embodied care itself. More fundamentally, it 
would also disrupt the association between being human and being 
cared for.
176
 After all, it is not only women who experience the 
connection and dependency of gestation; it is everyone, at least so far. 
Rather than looking at pregnancy and concluding that women are 
especially connected to others, we could conclude that everyone 
begins in a fundamental state of connected dependence. Ectogenesis 
would deprive us of this shared archetype of human connection. 
CONCLUSION 
Artificial gestation, if technologically possible, is probably in our 
distant future. Nonetheless, the belief that it is just around the corner 
plays a role in the rhetoric that shapes our understanding of 
reproduction and our legal analysis of abortion and surrogacy. The 
result is the further entrenchment of the particular model of 
reproduction that gave rise to the fantasy in the first place—genetic 
preformationism—at the expense of other models of pregnancy as the 
gradual creation of a child and a fundamental experience of 
connection. 
 
                                                                                                                 
 
VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN’S DEVELOPMENT (1982), focused on moral 
development in children. See, e.g., id. at 25 (describing an experiment which “suggest[ed] that 
the edge girls have on moral development during the early school years gives way at puberty 
with the ascendance of formal logic thought in boys”). 
175 See, e.g., FINEMAN, supra note 5, at 30–40 (discussing the universality of dependency 
and the myth of individual autonomy). 
176 It is possible that this disruption would operate on the individual level by interfering 
with the ectogenic child’s relational capacity. See Sander-Staudt, supra note 166, at 121 
(expressing uncertainty as to how ectogenesis will “affect the relational potential of a child”). 
